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I. INTRODUCTION
There is an impressive body of work to support the notion that the
law performs an expressive function that "produces and reproduces
the dispositions and values" of society.' Legal norms-the standards
Associate Professor of Law, Widener University School of Law; B.A., Dickinson
College, 1973; M.A., The Johns Hopkins University, 1976; J.D., The Dickinson
School of Law, 1983. Thanks to Professors Ann H. Britton, John C. Landis and
Nathaniel C. Nichols for their reading of and helpful comments on earlier drafts
of this article, and to Vanessa Gosa, Michelle Dubrow and David King for their
valued assistance. I would also like to thank M.S. Proctor, who is indispensable as
the person she uniquely is.
1. See Katherine T. Bartlett, Re-Erpressing Parenthood, 98 YALE L.J. 293, 295
(1988); MAJRY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW (1987), 8
("[L]aw is not just an ingenious collection of devices to avoid or adjust disputes
and to advance this or that interest, but also a way that a society makes sense of
things. It is 'part of a distinctive manner of imagining the real.' "(quoting CLIF-
FORD GEERTZ, Local Knowledge: Further Essays in Interpretive Anthropology
175 (1983)); Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Towards a Revitalization of Family
Law, 69 TEx. L. REV. 245,281 (1990):
Why should law, as opposed to religion or custom, be pressed into service
to further a society's values? One must start from the proposition that
we need families, broadly defined, as I think it is clear that we do. Some
agency must perform the role of describing desired family behavior be-
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of conduct for parties having recourse to the legal system and the stan-
dards of operation for the legal system-are founded upon a range of
social norms. Social norms are the standards for attitudes, feelings,
and behaviors that are permitted, expected or prohibited among mem-
bers of a society.2 There is not always consensus as to values in a soci-
ety, particularly in American society where social norms may conflict
or collide with one another from time to time.3 Nonetheless, the val-
ues of a society have one thing in common: they are deeply rooted in
social history and social expression (including legal expression). 4 An
example can be seen in family law.
The family consists of a variety of component relationships (hus-
band/wife; parent/child). For legal purposes, the family is formed
through the marriage relationship. New relationships are formed
within the family upon the birth or adoption of children. The family
relationships continue in the event of divorce, a process which begins,
often well before the separation, with the distress of the husband/wife
relationship.5 The separation of the spouses and the involvement of
the legal system through a filing for divorce represent peaks in the
divorce process, but are only transitions in the continuing life of the
family. The family then typically proceeds through a time of transi-
tion and disequilibrium as the family members assume new roles and
cause, left unguided, humans are very likely to act on short-term individ-
ual interests. It is axiomatic that, in modern industrial societies, religion
and custom are growing progressively weaker as normative forces and
law progressively stronger. Law has become our civil religion and the
one universally accepted arbiter of correct behavior.
Robert H. Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudication. Judicial Functions in the Face
of Indeterminacy, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 226, 265 (1975)("[L]egal rules, es-
pecially in an area touching upon substantial intrafamilial relationships, should
not contradict deeply held and widely shared social values."); Katherine Bartlett
& Carol Stack, Joint Custody, Feminism and the Dependency Dilemma, 2 BERKE-
LEY WoiNsEN's L.J. 9, 28 n.93, (1986); MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK 101-08
(1991); ("Let us never succumb to the temptation of believing that legislation and
judicial decrees play only minor roles.... The habits, if not the hearts, of people
have been and are being altered every day by legislative acts, judicial decisions,
and executive orders." (quoting MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., STRENGTH TO LovE
33-34 (1981)); See also Jon Elster, Solomonic Judgments: Against the Best Interest
of the Child, 54 U. CHL L. REv. 1, 34 (1987); Robert A. Baruch Bush, Mediation
and Adjudication, Dispute Resolution and Ideology: An Imaginary Conversa-
tion, 3 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL IssuES 1 (1989-1990).
2. See BEuLAH ROBERTS COMPTON & BURT GALAWAY, SOCIAL WORK PROcESSES 86
(1979).
3. See Melvin A. Eisenberg, Private Ordering Through Negotiation" DisputeSettle-
ment and Rulemaking, 89 HARV. L. REv. 637, 643 (1976). See also Mnookin, supra
note 1 at 264; COMPTON & GALAWAY, supra note 2, at 34.
4. See Thomas L. Shaffer, The Legal Ethics of Belonging, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 703, 708
(1988).
5. JuDITH S. WALLERSTEIN & JOAN BERLIN KELLY, SURVIVING THE BREAKUp: How
CHILDREN AND PARENTS COPE wrrH DIVORCE 4 (1980).
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relationships with one another and with others.6 In the ideal, family
members-adults and children-are eventually able to gain a sense of
understanding and comfort in their new roles and relationships with
one another.7 They are able to reorder their relationships and to grow
into the new family relationships formed by the reordering; they do
not terminate the family relationship. An American social norm envi-
sions family as transcending each of its component relationships; it,
therefore, continues to exist, perhaps even indefinitely, beyond the
termination of the husband/wife relationship.
One might say that this is because families have less to do with
choice than with belonging.8 Thomas Shaffer sees family as an "or-
ganic community" 9 in which individuals have not so much chosen one
another but have joined with one another in recognition of an associa-
tion. In doing so, individuals acquire a sense of belonging. It follows
that marriage is not so much an individual, rational choice as it is an
expression of recognizing oneself in another and an expression of asso-
ciation or belonging.O "In these ordinary ways of accounting to our-
selves for ourselves, it is the family that causes individuals to make
the promises that begin, develop, and continue families."11 Spouses/
parents may find it necessary to live apart because they are unable to
continue living together. They do, and should, have a right to seek
new relationships. But, especially when one is considering families in
6. Id. at 99. See also id. at 111, 121, and 134.
7. Id at 4.
8. See Shaffer, supra note 4, at 707, 711.
9. Thomas L. Shaffer, The Legal Ethics of Radical Individualism, 65 TEx. L. REV.
963, 965 (1987). One might argue that the current law of divorce and its ancilla-
ries takes an individualistic view of family as a "collectivity," a mechanical entity
which is comprised of individuals who choose to affiliate with one another. See
id. at n.8. A more deeply held social view, however, would hold family as a "com-
munity," an organic entity at the root of society from which an individual cannot
simply choose to separate. See also WENDELL BERRY, Men and Women in Search
of Common Ground, in HoME EcONOMICs 112 (1987):
There is a strong possibility that the basic human sexual unit is com-
posed of a man and a woman (bodies and minds), plus their history to-
gether, plus their kin and descendants, plus their place in the world with
its economy and history, plus their natural neighborhood, plus their
human community with its memories, satisfactions, expectations and
hopes.
10. See Shaffer, supra note 4, at 706, 707.
11. Shaffer, supra note 9, at 970-71.
Indeed, marriage is a union much more than practical, for it looks both
to our survival as a species and to the survival of our definition as human
beings-that is, as creatures who make promises and keep them, who
care devotedly and faithfully for one another, who care properly for the
gifts of life in this world.
BERRY, HOME ECONOMICS, supra note 9, at 117. See also Mnookin & Kornhauser,
infra note 66, at 984 (describing the importance of the ability to make binding
promises to the possibility of dispute resolution).
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which the husband/wife relationship has occasioned parent/child rela-
tionships, the family does not end upon the separation and legal disso-
lution of the relationship between husband and wife. While the idea
of freedom to pursue other relationships after divorce has strong so-
cial support, particularly among men,' 2 there is also pervasive social
support for the idea that family relationships are important to the
identities of family members, to the development of infants and chil-
dren, and to the survival of society.'3 "We cannot not belong to our
organic communities, although we can deceive ourselves about belong-
ing."14 It is a premise of this article that the structure and mechanics
of current child custody law are such that the widely accepted social
norm that family members continue to have a fiduciary relationship
despite dissolution of the husband-wife relationship is not effectively
operating as a legal norm. 5
The establishment as a legal norm that the family is an organic
relationship which is, even in terms of the relationship between
spouses, reordered but not dissolved upon divorce seems less radical
and extreme when viewed outside the shadow of the current individu-
alist legal norm. The social norm can be found throughout American
culture: in religious tradition;16 in literature;17 in popular culture;B
12. See generally Woodhouse, supra note 1, at 285; See also Frank F. Furstenburg, Jr.,
Divorce and the American Family, 16 ANN. REv. Soc. 379, 384 (1990).
13. See Woodhouse, supra note 1, at 266.
14. See Shaffer, supra note 4, at 711.
15. See Eisenberg, supra note 3, at 649. Regarding incentives of interdependent par-
ties to negotiate, Eisenberg notes: "[A party] consents to negotiate because he
believes himself morally obliged to do so, or, more pragmatically, because he be-
lieves that establishing rules by the sheer use of power may entail undue costs."
Id. at 675; BLAcK'S LAW DICrIONARY 563-64 (5th ed. 1979)(defining the meaning
of fiduciary). See also infra text accompanying note 138.
16. See Shaffer, supra note 9, at 971.
17. See BERRY, supra note 9, at 113 ('"To propose temporariness as a goal in such
relationships is to bring them under the rule of aims and standards that prevent
them from beginning. Neither marriage, nor kinship, nor friendship, nor neigh-
borhood can exist with a life expectancy that is merely convenient."). See also
FREDERICK BuscH, HARRY AND CATHARINE (1990); ANNE TYLER, BREATHING LES-
SONS (1988); NoRMAN MACLEAN, A RWvER RUNS THROUGH IT, 76 (1976); William
Wharton, Field Burning, 37 GRANTA 93 (Autumn 1991); Geoffrey Wolff, Water-
way, 37 GRANTA 221 (Autumn 1991).
18. See JOSEPH CAMPBELL, MYTHS To LIvE By, 20 (1972):
[I]n this wonderful human brain of ours there has dawned a realization
unknown to the other primates. It is that of the individual, conscious of
himself as such, and aware that he, and all that he cares for, will one day
die.
This recognition of mortality and the requirement to transcend it is
the first great impulse to mythology. And along with this there runs
another realization; namely, that the social group into which the individ-
ual has been borne, which nourishes and protects him and which, for the
greater part of his life, he must himself help to nourish and protect, was
flourishing long before his own birth and will remain when he is gone.
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and in custom.19 Although important social norms concerning individ-
uality and gender equality are reflected in current predominant legal
norms, those norms are not the only, nor even the predominant, social
norms with respect to family life.20 The systems of law for addressing
child custody disputes are currently bound and bounded by rights-ori-
ented norms and classic common law adjudicative procedures that, in
effect, do no more than discharge the law's minimum duty to family
members to protect them from one another and to ensure that no one
is overtly abused or neglected.
Current legal norms send the signal that family begins at marriage;
begins to end at separation; and is terminated upon divorce. After di-
vorce, only the parent/child relationship is treated as a fiduciary rela-
tionship, and even dealings with respect to child support and visitation
are at arm's length transactions between the parents.
One of the essences of family is associational-its members take
responsibility for one another. For example, it is common for family
members to resolve disputes among themselves. While disputes
within a family can rend it apart, the process can also strengthen the
bonds between family members and develop the abilities of family
members to function in society.21 A "good parent" is not content sim-
ply to refrain from abusing or neglecting his/her children, or even to
protect his/her children from abuse or neglect. 22 A "good parent"
assumes responsibility not only for the child's protection, but also for
his/her relationship with that child. He/she is satisfied only when
That is to say, not only does the individual member of our species, con-
scious of himself as such, face death, but he confronts also the necessity
to adapt himself to whatever order of life may happen to be that of the
community into which he has been born, this being an order of life
superordinated to his own, a superorganism into which he must allow
himself to be absorbed, and through participation in which he will come
to know the life that transcends death. In every one of the mythological
systems that in the long course of history and prehistory have been prop-
agated in the various zones and quarters of this earth, these two funda-
mental realizations-of the inevitability of individual death and the
endurance of the social order-have been combined symbolically and
constitute the nuclear structuring force of the rites and, therefore, the
society.
See also Elaine Tyler May, Myths and Realities of the American Family, in RID-
DLES OF IDENTITY IN MODERN TIMES, 539 (ANTOINE PROST & GtRARD GtRARD,
eds.) (of the series A HISTORY OF PRIVATE LIFE, Philippe Aries & Georges Duby,
general eds. 1991); Shaffer, supra note 9, at 971.
19. See Woodhouse, supra note 1, at 281.
20. See Shaffer, supra note 4, at 709.
21. WALLERSTEIN & KELLY, supra note 5, at 17. (Constant striving for mastery
within the process can result in "a greater understanding of the nature of human
relationships in general.") See also MARY ANN GLENDON, THE TRANSFORMATION
OF FAMILY LAw 297 (1987).
22. See Elster, supra note 1, at 20. See also infra text accompanying note 105.
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that child has "turned out" well.23
The law does not currently aspire to norms or provide procedures
which are effective in ensuring that families "turn out well." 24 That
is, present law sets the resolution of child custody disputes in terms of
the competing positions of the individual parents or child(ren), rather
than in terms of all of the parties' interests in their relationships with
one another.25 The legal norms invoked in custody dispute resolution
could more faithfully reflect and express social norms by demanding
commitment and interdependence from family members, rather than
expressing values that undermine those social norms.26 And the pro-
cedures could demonstrate that, while the law protects and respects
the fundamental rights of individuals, it also protects and respects
"those aspects that make marriage and family a worthwhile collective
enterprise for couples, children, and society,"27 thereby "acting
synergetically" to reinforce those social norms as well.28
This Article will begin with an analysis of the adjudicatory process
as it is currently used in post-divorce child custody determinations. I
will follow this analysis with a practical illustration of the way the
adjudicatory process unfolds in a child custody case. An analysis of
non-adjudicatory dispute resolution-specifically a negotiatory pro-
cess-for child custody cases will follow, and the Article concludes af-
ter a proposal for a negotiatory process utilizing the primary caretaker
presumption and an impasse procedure known as Final Offer
Selection.
II. AN ANALYSIS OF THE CHILD CUSTODY
ADJUDICATORY PROCESS
Because processes in current family law for resolving child custody
disputes are commonly based upon an adjudication model, the imagery
of family life expressed by current law "contrasts everywhere with
the way most functioning families operate and with the circumstances
of mothers and young children in both intact and broken homes."29
Adjudication of the small percentage of child custody cases reaching
impasse3 0 entails the creation and operation of legal norms in a man-
23. See Bartlett, supra note 1, at 300.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 295.
26. CHRISTOPHER LAscH, HAVEN IN A HEARTLEss WORLD: THE FAmILY BEsiEGED
107 (1977).
27. See Woodhouse supra note 1 at 282.
28. Id at 279 (noting the need for "positive statements about families now, in hopeful
anticipation of a trend in favor of increased security and stability in marriage and
family that our children so desperately need.").
29. See GLENDON, supra note 21, at 297.
30. Gary Crippen, The Abundance of Family Law Appeals: Too Much of a Good
Thing?, XXVI FAm. L. Q. 85, 87 (1992). For example, in 1990 in Minnesota, 33%
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ner that is "highly stylized and tightly controlled."31 The process of
the creation of those legal norms is "vague and piecemeal because it
has grown through an accretion of opinions resolving individual dis-
putes."32 Because of this, and because only a minute percentage of
family law cases reach the appellate reporters,33 the law is slow in
reacting to developing social norms. American family law responds to
social developments sporadically, inconsistently, and often only when
its failure to respond creates discrepancies between social norms and
legal norms that are plainly unconscionable.3 4
The best and the worst of these trends can be seen in post-divorce
child custody law, where the law has responded to the emerging idea
of the rights of individuals and to the pluralist demands of heterogen-
eous American society. The law has accomplished this by institution-
alizing principles of gender equality-albeit primarily in the
abstract-and by "relinquish[ing] most of its overt attempts to pro-
mote any particular set of ideas about family life."35 As evidenced in
of trial court time was spent on family law matters; 2% of the family law cases
filed went to trial. In West Virginia, in that same year, 14,582 domestic relations
cases were filed; only 53 of those went to trial. The Minnesota figure--33% of
trial court time spent on family law matters-reflects the national average, ac-
cording to the Conference of State Court Administrators, the State Justice Insti-
tute and the National Center for State Courts (See STATE CouRT CASELOAD
STATIsTICS: 1990 ANNUAL REPORT 18 (1992)).
31. See Eisenberg, supra note 3, at 644.
32. See Woodhouse, supra note 1, at 252.
33. See Crippen, supra note 30, at 87. Of the 2% of Minnesota cases mentioned in
note 30 that went to trial, 34% were appealed. Of the 53 West Virginia cases
mentioned in note 30 that went to trial, 45 were appealed. See also Mnookin,
supra note 1, at 253; Adams v. Adams, 59 S.E.2d 366 (Ga. 1950); Finnegan v. Finne-
gan, 58 S.E.2d 594 (W.Va. 1950).
34. See Ex Parte Devine, 398 So.2d 686 (Ala. 1981); Johnson v. Johnson, 564 P.2d 71
(Alaska, 1977); Bazemore v. Davis, 394 A.2d 1377 (D.C. 1978); In Re Marriage of
Bowen and Bowen, 219 N.W.2d 683 (Iowa 1974); McAndrew v. McAndrew, 382
A.2d 1081 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1978); People of New York v. Watts, 77 Misc.2d 178
(N.Y. Fain. Ct. 1973) (all regarding the Tender Years Doctrine). See also Orr v.
Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979) (statutory imposition of alimony obligations on husbands,
but not wives); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979) (statutory scheme al-
lowing unwed mothers, but not unwed fathers, to block adoption of child by with-
holding consent); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (statutory
presumption of dependency for spouses of male members of uniformed services,
but not for spouses of female members); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 647 (1972)
(discrepancy in statutory age of majority between genders); Stanley v. Illinois, 405
U.S. 645 (1972) (discrepancy in statutory standards for custody between unmar-
ried fathers and married fathers, married or unmarried mothers, or divorced par-
ents); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (statutory preference for men as
appointees as administrators of decedents' estates); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1
(1967) (statutory scheme to prohibit and punish marriages between members of
different races).
35. GLENDON, supra note 21 at 297 ("The result is often that other normative legal
propositions have tended to be phased out, even when they are quite widely
shared."). See also M.A. GLENDON, RIGHTs TALx, supra note 1, at 87.
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its art,36 literature,3 7 popular culture,38 and politics,39 American soci-
ety continues to attach mythic importance to "family values." But
when it comes to resolving custodial disputes between divorcing par-
ents, the nature and mechanics of the adjudicatory system in Ameri-
can law are such that social norms, reflecting what I will call fiduciary
values, 40 are rarely constructively addressed in the dispute resolution
process.
Adjudicatory systems are inherently unable to accommodate con-
flicts and collisions among legal norms. Because of that, any norm
which clashes with the dominant legal norms-which are generally
accepted as fostering important public values-is viewed as attempting
In places and times where law is only one of many coexisting systems of
social norms--and not the most important one among them-the silence
of the law on many subjects is of no particular importance .... In hetero-
geneous modern states, however, common values are harder to identify,
while law and its official enforcement apparatus are more universal and
highly developed than other forms of social regulation. Nowhere is this
more so than in the United States. Whether meant to be or not, law is
now regarded by many Americans as the principal carrier of those few
moral understandings that are widely shared by our diverse citizenry. In
these circumstances, legal silences can acquire unintended meanings.
Fiss, The Social and Political Foundations of Adjudication, 6 LAW & HUMAN BE-
HAVIOR 121, 127 (1982).
36. In keeping with the emerging obsession with individual rights in an era in which
mass production threatened the individual and cheapened the idea of community,
modern art obliquely acknowledged the existence of public values with respect to
family mainly through irony. See ROBERT HUGHES, THE SHOCK OF THE NEW, 342
(rev. ed., 1991); HERSCHEL BROWNING CHmpP, Theories of Modern Art (Giulio
Carol Argan: The Reasons for the Group) 497 (1968).
37. See supra note 17; 37 Granta 258 (Autumn 1991):
They fuck you up, your mum and dad,' Philip Larkin wrote, but Philip
Larkin got it wrong. There are also your brothers and your sisters. And
your uncles, your grandfather, your endless cousins, your mother-in-law,
your father-in-law and your children. There are always the children.
The family no relationship is more important, or more powerful, or
more enduring. Or potentially more destructive.
38. See PARENTS (Vestron Pictures 1988)(a film about the world behind the social
norms of the American suburbs in the 1950s).
39. See, e.g., Katha Pollitt, Why I Hate "Family Values" (Let Me Count the Ways);
THE NATION July 20/27, 1992, at 88. See also John Frohnmayer, Is That What He
Meant?, NEW YORK TIMEs June 14, 1992, § 4, at 19.
40. I will use the term throughout this article to denote norms of nurturance and
"family-centric behavior" which I see as having strong roots in social norms,
which are essential social values as a matter of public policy and which, I would
even argue, are values about which some consensus exists. See Woodhouse, supra
note 1, at 286; GLENDON, supra note 21, at 303.
A 'fiduciary relation' arises whenever confidence is reposed by one per-
son in the integrity and fidelity of another... and domination and influ-
ence result on the other .... It exists where there is special confidence
reposed in one who in equity and good conscience is bound to act in good
faith and with due regard to interests of one reposing the confidence.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 564 (5th ed. 1979).
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:1228
to impose private values. Consequently, the law has become silent
with respect to social or moral values of any kind other than those
protecting and encouraging the autonomy of individuals. This silence
expresses a legal norm that implicitly demeans fiduciary values. By
abdicating the endeavor of creating and promoting norms for Ameri-
can family life, the law delivers "covert messages" 41 through a "domi-
nant legal imagery of separateness and independence" 42 which "not
only fails to reflect the realities of most families, particularly of
mothers with young children, but denigrates that reality, claiming 'de-
pendency is somehow degrading, and implicitly denying the impor-
tance of human intersubjectivity.' 43
It is instructive to analyze the nature and mechanics of adjudica-
tory systems, when applied with particularity to the resolution of child
custody disputes. Upon examining the applicable legal and social
norms and the mechanics of control of the process one finds either
ominous silence with respect to the fiduciary nature of family, or legal
expression that works to the detriment of ongoing family
relationships."
Although the legal norms currently dominant have legitimately
evolved from social norms favoring gender equality, individual free-
dom and tolerance,45 the "binary" nature of the common law adjudica-
tory process resolves conflicts between competing values in such a way
as to demean the less dominant value:
In reaching, and even more clearly in rationalizing outcomes, any given propo-
sition of fact is normally found to be either true or false, colliding norms
are generally treated as if only the more compelling norm were applicable,
conflicting norms are generally treated as if only the dominant norm were
41. See Woodhouse, supra note 1, at 264.
42. Id-
43. Id.; See GLENDON, supra note 21, at 297; See also Fiss, supra note 35, at 128. Fiss
defines "public values" as "the values that define a society and give it its identity
and inner coherence." Id. (It should be noted that in the model of adjudication as
"structural reform" he proposes, rights are seen as "the concrete embodiment of
[public] values, and as such .... an expression of our communality rather than our
individuality." Id The model of adjudication analyzed in this article is that iden-
tified by Fiss as "dispute resolution" adjudication.)
44. See GLENDON, supra note 1, at 102:
Americans today, rightly or wrongly, regard many legal norms, espe-
cially those of criminal, family and constitutional law, as expressions of
minimum common values. They are disconcerted by legal norms that
seem to be radically at odds with common understandings. In such cir-
cumstances, the silences of law can begin to speak. Now that law has
assumed an increasingly prominent position in relation to other social
norms, we need to be especially careful in our modern defenses or re-
statements of older positions.
See also Woodhouse, supra note 1, at 278 (examining the notion in American di-
vorce law of a "clean break" in spouses' interdependence upon divorce).
45. See Woodhouse, supra note 1, at 264.
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applicable, and each disputant is generally determined to be either 'right' or
'wrong'.
4 6
Thus, in a reordering family where, for example, the child has always
been primarily attended to by the mother, a court will typically follow
the prominent legal norm of painstakingly and, if necessary, adver-
sarily seeking the "best interests of the child"47 as determinative of
the outcome of the case when it collides with a norm stressing the
importance of continuity and nurturing in the child's relationships.
The court will, in effect, reject the latter legal norm as inapplicable in
the presence of the former, more legally compelling norm.48
Similarly, in a child custody/support case, where a legal norm that
gives divorced spouses the right to form new families conflicts with a
norm that would stress the importance of the continued emotional and
financial support of a child, a court characteristically treats the latter
norm as subordinate. Indeed, the child's emotional and financial well-
being is so subordinate as to be of no consequence in limiting the non-
custodial parent's right to undertake new obligations that might com-
promise his/her ability to meet existing obligations.49
Courts that ostensibly eschew fault or poverty as legal norms in
child custody cases commonly decide the cases by applying act-ori-
ented legal norms that consider socially-disfavored behavioral circum-
stances-such as drug-use, gambling, promiscuity, or a marginal
ability to provide financial support-as factors which the courts typi-
cally consider in the determination. Person or relationship-oriented
legal norms, such as the extent to which the child's best interests are
inherently served by a relationship with a drug-using, gambling, pro-
miscuous or impoverished parent,5 0 are consequently given little or no
consideration.
46. See Eisenberg, supra note 3, at 654. See also Fiss, supra note 35, at 123.
47. See Mnookin, supra note 1, at 236, n.45. See also David L. Chambers, Rethinking
the Substantive Rules for Custody Disputes in Divorce, 83 MIcH. L. REV. 477,478
(1984).
48. See Woodham v. Woodham, 539 So.2d 293 (Ala. Civ. App. 1988); Ross v. Ross, 339
A.2d 447 (D.C. 1975); Coles v. Coles, 204 A.2d 330 (D.C. 1964); Miller v. Miller, 202
N.W.2d 105 (Iowa 1972).
49. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978); Cooper v. Utah, 684 F.Supp. 1060 (D.
Utah 1987); McCutcheon v. McCutcheon, 289 S.W.2d 521 (Ark. 1956); Motes v.
Motes, 192 S.E.2d 165 (Ga. 1972); Hanson v. Hanson, 287 P.2d 879 (Wash. 1955);
and Shattuck v. Shattuck, 251 P. 851 (Wash. 1927).
50. See, e.g., Beasley v. Beasley, 146 So.2d 588 (Ala. 1964); Bennett v. Bennett, 160
So.2d 863 (Fla. Dit. Ct. App. 1962); Wallis v. Wallis, 200 A.2d 164 (Md. 1964);
Palmer v. Palmer, 207 A.2d 481 (Md. 1965); Usery v. Usery, 367 P.2d 449 (Or.
1961); McBroom v. McBroom, 384 P.2d 961 (Utah 1963); and Warnecke v. Warne-
cke, 182 P.2d 699 (Wash. 1947). Despite the fact that "[i]n a divorce custody fight,
a court must evaluate the attitudes, dispositions, capacities, and shortcomings of
each parent to apply the best-interest standard," there is "nothing inherent in
custody disputes requiring resolution by a person-oriented rule." See also
Mnookin, supra note 1, at 251.
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Another salient feature of the adjudicatory approach to resolving
child custody disputes is seen in the control of the mechanics of the
process. Control of the process of adjudication is not by the parties,
but by a third party adjudicator, who is a stranger to the parties.5 1
This has a profound effect on the process itself: in the creation and
promotion of legal norms; in the determination of facts; in the choice
of remedy; and in the emotional effect on the parties.52
In social interactions, ranges of social norms are weighed and bal-
anced, and even competing or conflicting views can often be accommo-
dated.53 Adjudication, on the other hand, entails choosing among
competing or conflicting norms in a binary fashion.5 4 Legal norms in
adjudicatory processes have been created so as to promote the propri-
ety and legitimacy of that choosing process to the parties and to the
public. For example, adjudicatory processes in general are held to a
strict legal norm of neutrality and objectivity. In a sense it is this ob-
jectivity that legitimizes the adjudicator's authority. 55 An adjudicator
is thus likely to take a binary approach to the application of other
legal norms, in order to avoid any appearance that discretionary pref-
erence controlled the outcome.5 6
On the surface, it would seem to be of particular importance in
child custody cases that the dispute be resolved without even the ap-
pearance of bias or favoritism, given the low degree of trust commonly
present between parties to a dissolved or dissolving spousal relation-
ship. But the neutrality/objectivity norm in adjudication is most effec-
tive in adjudications that evaluate past conduct of the parties-
determinations of "right" and "wrong" that can be effectively judged
from a detached review of evidence of past conduct. Unlike those
types of adjudications, child custody determinations seek to determine
the future placement of a child in a setting where new relationships
are being formed.57 The relationship between parents of minor chil-
dren in an intact family is highly accommodative and takes into ac-
count social norms which are held to have no relevance in the typical
adjudicatory child custody procedure.58 Consequently, the child cus-
51. See Eisenberg, supra note 3, at 655.
52. 1& at 655.
53. Id at 640-42, 645.
54. 1& at 654.
55. Id. at 655. See also Fiss, supra note 35, at 125.
56. Eisenberg, supra note 3, at 655.
57. New relationships include those between the parents; between each parent and
the child(ren); between parents parties outside the erstwhile family unit; and be-
tween children and parties outside the erstwhile family unit. See also, Mnookin,
supra note 1, at 258 ("[E]ven where a judge has substantial information about the
child's past home life and the present alternatives, present-day knowledge about
human behavior provides no basis for the kind of individualized predictions re-
quired by the best-interests standard.").
58. See infra text accompanying note 191.
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tody determination-a central process in the reordering of family rela-
tionships-is not presently characterized by norms that recognize
these dissolving and reforming individual familial relationships.59
Nor does the process facilitate continued interdependence and accom-
modation in these relationships. These norms are overmatched in cur-
rent adjudicative systems by norms that seek to protect individual
procedural rights while predicting parental suitability for custody on
the basis of individual past behavior.60
Adjudication can be said to inherently advance legal norms favor-
ing judicial economy. It is argued that by stylizing the decision-mak-
ing process to require a much smaller investment of time and energy
on the part of a relatively small number of decision-makers, the im-
passe procedure can be made more readily accessible to a wide range
of disputants, and the quality of judicial conduct can be more readily
monitored and controlled. 61 Because the stranger is not intimately fa-
miliar with the parties' needs and wants, the process calls for finding
the norms proposed by one of them to be determinative. Thus, it is
less likely that neither party will be satisfied with the outcome.62
The notion of efficiency runs aground when one considers the sub-
ject matter of child custody disputes, however. To cite the ready avail-
ability of judges as support for use of the adjudicatory process in child
custody disputes is to ignore the enormous investment of time and en-
ergy by the parties, bargaining to no avail in the shadow of adjudica-
tion. While the ready availability of judges summons favorable images
to the minds of attorneys familiar with court backlogs in civil cases, 63
this gain is made in disregard of the child's notion of time while the
family is adrift64 and the psychological strain on child and parents
59. See Woodhouse, supra note 1, at 284.
60. See Mnookin, supra note 1, at 258.
61. See Eisenberg, supra note 3, at 655.
62. Id
63. See BARRY MAHONEY, CHANGING TIuES IN TRIAL COURTS: CASEFLOW MANAGE.
mENT AND DELAY REDUCTION IN URBAN TRIAL COURTS 53 (The National Center
for State Courts, 1988). See also TERENCE DuNGWORTH & NICHOLAS M. PACE,
STATISTICAL OVERVIEW OF CIVIL LITGATION IN THE FEDERAL COURTS, 16 (1990);
Robert H. Mnookin, Divorce Bargaining: The Limits on Private Ordering, 18 U.
MCH. J.L. REF. 1015, 1019 (1985).
64. See JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN, ANNA FREUD & ALBERT J. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST
INTERESTS OF THE CHILD, 40 (1973). See also WALLERSTEIN & KELLY, supra note
5, at 124:
For parents and children who share the repeated tasks of daily living
together, time is part of the unobtrusive background of family life and
provides a steady, muted rhythm which by its very unobtrusiveness con-
veys the comforting notion that the present will endure. For the visiting
parent and child, time is a jarring presence. The constraints of time and
space may impose a severe burden or, in some instances, a welcome limit
on the interactions of the relationship. But both parent and child must
now find time for their meeting, and must part on time. Both meeting
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alike as they await resolution of their situation from on high.65 Fur-
thermore, the hoped-for availability of quality adjudicators does little
to address the potential for harm to parties and children in a bargain-
ing process (prior to impasse) in which the less risk-averse parent can
use the unpredictability of adjudication66 as leverage67 .
As to the notion that judicial determinism can be made palatable
by basing the determination on norms proposed by one of the par-
ties,68 it seems almost cynical in the context of child custody adjudica-
tion69 . To have a stranger deem, in the name of resolute efficiency,
the norms proposed by one of the parties as dominant and the norms
proposed by the other as irrelevant is to allow the impasse to supplant
the family relationships as the focus of proceeding.7 0 To usurp from
the reordering family the power to accommodate varying norms is to
devalue the family because it is reordering.
As strangers, adjudicators are much more likely to invoke norms
dependent on the nature of the acts of the participants rather than
norms dependent on their personal characteristics or relationships.
Here, one can see how the nature of child custody proceedings con-
flicts with the nature of adjudication. While the child custody adjudi-
catory process seeks to make a determination based upon the nature
of past acts of the respective parents, the reordering of family relation-
ships depends to a very great degree upon the personal characteristics
of the parties involved.71 Adjudication might automatically resort to
an act-oriented norm such as the effect of a pattern of past drug use by
a parent on the custody determination, giving this norm much more
weight than a person-oriented norm such as the effect that losing cus-
tody will have on the stability and emotional availability of that parent
(and the potential consequent effect upon the child should that parent
and parting have acquired new meanings and accompanying anxieties
which may long endure.
See also Carol S. Bruch, And How Are the Children? The Effects of Ideology and
Mediation on Child Custody Law and Children's Well-Being in the United States,
2 INT. J. L & FAM. 106, 108 (1988); Richard Neely, The Primary Caretaker Rule:
Child Custody and the Dynamics of Greed, 3 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 68, 176 (1984).
65. See WALLERSTEIN & KELLY, supra note 5, at 36 ("diminished capacity to parent");
Neely, supra note 64, at 174.
66. Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law:
The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 969-71 (1979).
67. See Neely, supra note 64, at 177.
68. See id. Note that the current dominant legal norms provide little reassurance to
potential parties in terms of predicting the outcome of custody determinations.
See Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 66.
69. See Neely, supra note 64, at 178 ("As Solomon showed us, the better a mother is
as a parent, the less likely she is to allow a destructive fight over her children.").
See also Fiss, supra note 35, at 124.
70. See Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 66, at 958.
71. See Eisenberg, supra note 3, at 643-44.
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destabilize or withdraw as a result of the determination).72 The na-
ture of personal characteristics and relationships is very difficult to
grasp, even for intimates. And even if an adjudicator were to pre-
scribe person-oriented legal norms, it is likely that such a prescription
would lack authority coming from a stranger.73
Reliance on control by a stranger to the dispute and the binary na-
ture of the adjudicatory process in child custody determinations pro-
foundy affects the use and weight of facts in the process. On the one
hand, it is the very standard of objectivity and neutrality behind the
"stranger" role that has caused the creation of exclusionary rules of
evidence, which essentially sacrifice potential accuracy for potential
fairness to the parties.74 In reality, however, the "facts" of family life
in a family where the husband/wife relationship is dissolving are ex-
tremely unlikely to be objectively provable. In fact, the family setting
in this phase often has such a highly charged emotional atmosphere
that, for all intents and purposes, each version of the facts (though
they contradict one another) is correct or "true" for each respective
party.75 Without reliable facts the notion of "principles," upon which
adjudicatory systems are based,76 is hobbled. The court is left to
choose between skewed accounts of past conduct presented by the op-
posing parents from which to make predictions about future conduct
and conjure new and stable relationships. The adjudicator is limited
to the consideration of evidence "laboriously reconstructed," 77 often
through expert testimony, and editorially enhanced or laundered by
72. See WALLERsTEIN & KELLY, supra note 5, at 127.
73. See Eisenberg, supra note 3, at 657 ("[Ihe stranger-adjudicator is likely to treat
as irrelevant some principles the disputants themselves regard as relevant, and
consequently to have at his command less than the sum total of principles poten-
tially applicable to the dispute."). See also Fiss, supra note 35, at 125.
74. See Eisenberg, supra note 3, at 658.
75. On the other hand,
[In dispute-negotiation most factual issues can be determined by explicit
or tacit agreement, since the participants in the process will have per-
sonal knowledge of most of the material facts. Where the disputants do
not have personal knowledge, they can often agree on the truth of a
proposition on the basis of their mutual acceptance of a relator's credibil-
ity. If agreement on a factual proposition cannot be reached, a further
cluster of techniques is available. The disputants can assume the truth
of the proposition provisionally, and proceed to develop and examine its
implications; they can bypass the proposition provisionally, to determine
whether a settlement can be reached if its truth is left open; or they can
make a settlement whose terms accommodate, in an appropriate way,
conflicting versions of the proposition or doubt as to its validity. Finally,
if none of these techniques proves effective, the disputants can terminate
negotiation entirely.
Eisenberg, supra note 3, at 657. See also Mnookin supra note 1, at 228.
76. See Eisenberg, supra note 3, at 638-39.
77. Eisenberg, supra note 3, at 658. See also DAvID A. BINDER & PAUL BERGMAN,
FACT INVESTIGATION, 30 (1984). For a discussion on "normative facts" see id-, at
6-8.
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
representatives of the parties. The process depends upon a linear re-
construction of "fact" through the preemption-not consideration-of
alternative hypotheses. Adjudication does not afford its participants
the luxury of considering facts that might support some of the alterna-
tive-even conflicting or colliding-legal norms that are important
considerations in the life of a particular family. The binary nature of
the process also forces artificial certainty about "facts" that the adjudi-
cator may feel are only slightly more credible than those proposed by
the opposing party7 8 and may force the adjudicator to make a decision
when neither side has proven enough to enable a clear determina-
tion.79 The nature of adjudication, then, raises questions about its reli-
ability as a fact-gathering process.
The range of possible remedies available in a child custody case is
affected by resort to an adjudicatory system. Because child custody
cases require the reordering of a series of interpersonal relationships
in the context of an ongoing family relationship, they might naturally
lend themselves to person-oriented remedies. An example might be a
visitation arrangement crafted to suit aspects of the lives of the parties
that only they can articulate to one another. One party to an adjudica-
tion might have a tacit interest that will be understood by the other
party in a way that no one else could. Such an interest might never
surface in the adjudicatory process. Understanding this interest could
facilitate a resolution that might not otherwise be possible in an adju-
dicatory process that forces parties to take positions and elicit "facts"
to support those positions. Appropriate remedies could turn upon
something as apparently inconsequential as an apology, a symbolic
gesture, or a standing invitation that eases the emotional or psycholog-
ical turmoil of family reordering.80 A stranger to the parties is un-
likely to be able to determine an appropriate personal remedy; is
probably unlikely to suggest such a remedy to the parties even if it
occurs to him or her; and would very likely lack the personal author-
ity to make such a remedy appear appropriate to both parties even if
prescribed.81 The binary nature of the process is more likely to lead to
a win/lose choice between remedies proposed by the parties than to a
consideration of alternatives that might preserve and encourage their
reordered relationship.
It is inherent in the adjudicatory process that judgment is passed
78. Eisenberg, supra note 3, at 658.
79. Id This takes on even more importance when one considers that the "facts" de-
termined in the course of a custody case can profoundly affect the myths and
legends by which families and family members define themselves. See Shaffer,
supra note 9, at 965-66.
80. Eisenberg, supra note 3, at 646-49 (discussing the element of reconciliation); see
also id at 658.
81. Id at 658.
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upon the parties by a superordinate stranger-adjudicator. Each party
to a child custody adjudication:
is by posture a supplicant and by role an inferior. He must tacitly admit that
he cannot handle his own affairs. He must appear at times and places which
may be decidedly and expensively inconvenient. He must bend his thought
and expressions, perhaps his very body, in ways that will move the adjudica-
tor. He must show various signs of obeisance-speak only when permitted, be
orderly, and act respectfully if not deferentially.82
The process constantly reinforces the parties' feelings that their lives
are beyond their control. Because of the binary nature of the process,
an impasse between the parties--or, indeed, any settlement which the
parties agreed to in the shadow of such a process-judges the respec-
tive parties as "right" and "wrong." Public judgment by a stranger on
the most intimate relationships in life, often at a time when that life is
in a state of disorientation and uncertainty, and by means of a process
over which the party has little or no control "tends both to generate a
state of tension and to drive the disputants irreconcilably apart,
whatever the outcome."8 3
III. AN ILLUSTRATION OF THE PROCESS
A view of the child custody adjudication process in the abstract il-
lustrates the effect of the nature and mechanics of adjudication on the
outcome of cases. In the abstract, the process can be outlined as
follows:
1) Intact Family
2) Dissolution of Spousal Relationship within Family
3) Drift Period/Preliminary Maneuvering




7) Impasse Resolution Procedure
8) Determination/Modification
As Wallerstein and Kelly pointed out, the process of dissolution
and reordering of family relationships begins before the process goes
public.8 4 An intact family of wife, husband and children appears to
the public to begin to dissolve when the parents separate, but the rela-
tionship between the parents typically has to have deteriorated signifi-
cantly before the parties will resort to the legal system or even to the
act of separating. Typically there will be a period of preliminary legal
maneuvering: the defacto custodial parent may file for child support;
allegations of spousal abuse and perhaps a filing seeking a protective
order by one spouse may occur; or one parent may file for emergency
82. See i& at 659.
83. Id- at 660.
84. See supra note 5.
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custody, alleging abuse or neglect on the part of the other parent.
Each parent scrambles to be the first to convince a court that custody
should be with him/her until a final determination can be made. Al-
ready at this level the "best interests of the child" banner is being
flown by each side. In the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions in
the United States, the guiding principle of law in child custody dis-
putes between divorcing parents is the "Best Interests of the Child"
standard.8 5 Although there has been a chorus of criticism leveled at
the effectiveness of this standard,86 the standard represents the high-
water mark of an evolutionary succession of rules granting presump-
tive custody to the father, then to the parent "innocent" of marital
fault, then to the mother.8 7
These not-so-ancient rules evolved in response to changing social
norms, all the while ascribing essentially possessory parental rights
with respect to the children. Social norms gradually prevailed upon
legal norms to bring us to the present standard. Courts began to give
increased recognition to individual rights8S and to invalidate gender-
based presumptions in family law.8 9 The no-fault divorce revolution
of the 1970s sought to replace the inequities of the old legal norms
with notions of equality.90 With all of its clumsiness and inadequacy9 '
the "best interests" standard "represents a considerable ideological
and rhetorical advancement" 92 in that it embodies the by now deep-
seated and powerful social norm of the importance of protecting chil-
dren and it forces parents to "articulate their claims to children in
terms of the child's welfare"93 rather than in terms of parental
rights. 9 4
85. See supra note 47.
86. See Mnookin & Korphauser, supra note 66, at 972 n.77, 979; Woodhouse, supra
note 1, at 289; Elster, supra note 1, at 7 ("IThe principle is indeterminate, unjust,
self-defeating, and liable to be overridden by more general policy considera-
tions."). See also Chambers, supra note 47, at 480.
87. See Mnookin, supra note 1, at 234. See also Elster, supra note 1, at 7-11.
88. See Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979);
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645
(1972); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
89. See Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979);
Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 645 (1972); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677
(1973).
90. See LENORE J. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION, 16 (1985).
91. See Mnookin, supra note 1, at 229; Chambers, supra note 47, at 478.
92. See Bartlett, supra note 1, at 302.
93. Id.
94. See Furstenburg, supra note 12, at 384 ("In the late 1960s and 1970s, the 'divorce
revolution' brought about a demand for joint custody [citation omitted]-the
sharing of parental responsibility for the child."). Note that this effort to go be-
yond the best interests standard-although problematic in that it is often advo-
cated as a matter of parental right to shared association with the child, or child's
right to equitable distribution of the parents-is promising from the point of view
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It can be argued that, under the "Best Interests" standard, child
custody law is successful in resolving child custody disputes "without
resort to private force or violence" 95 and in protecting "the expecta-
tions and interests of the individuals directly affected, including the
child."96 Indeed, since as many as ninety percent of child custody
cases are settled by the parties before they reach the litigation stage of
the process 97 it can be argued that the present state of the art for
resolving child custody disputes is a highly effective one. The old
rules treated the parent/child relationship almost as a chattel bail-
ment and fostered unfair gender stereotypes. Those rules were re-
placed with a much more enlightened principle, with a dispute
resolution process that offers case-by-case review and apparently en-
courages private ordering98 in a high percentage of cases.
Nevertheless, adjudication under the "Best Interests" standard,
while it may be an improvement over past standards, may, in fact, be
contributing to the dislocation and dysfunction of families who must
resort to it. It is not denied that a norm which requires the court to
determine the disputed custody of a child according to what is in the
child's best interests represents an advance in child custody law. Such
a norm forces the parents to present their custody claims in terms of
the interests of another (the child) rather than in terms of self-inter-
est. Nevertheless, it is still an interest-based, or right-based, norm.99
It casts the reordering of the post-divorce family in terms of a clash of
individual interests, and the relationships involved are viewed in
terms of the extent to which the interests of one parent are able to
coincide with the suddenly all-important interests of the child.100
Such a standard puts the "interests of the child" on an artificial, ab-
stract plain. It focuses to a great degree on the satisfaction and well-
being of the child but gives little consideration to the child's interest in
her relationships with both of her parents. Moreover, it does not con-
sider the extent to which the child's best interests are bound up with
her interest in her family relationships.
When applied in an adjudicatory system, this ostensibly noble stan-
dard often results in the spectacle of the parents vying to portray the
child's best interests in such a way that they coincide with what that
parent has to offer. Because of the binary nature of adjudication, the
of this article to the extent that it represents an underlying social norm advocat-
ing shared responsibility.
95. Mnookin, supra note 1, at 229.
96. Id-
97. See MInookin & Kornhauser, supra note 66, at 951 n.3.
98. See Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 66, at 950 n.1 ("A definition of private
ordering attributed to Professor Fuller is 'law' that parties bring into existence by
agreement.").
99. See Bartlett, supra note 1, at 303.
100. See supra note 86.
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rights and obligations of the parties are sorted in such a way that one
parent will, in effect, be found to have the child's interests at heart,
leaving the clear implication that the other does not.' 0 ' The process
gives each parent (and her attorney) a clear incentive to attack the
relationship between the other parent and the child as a means of en-
hancing the appearance of the child's best interest in her.102 Perhaps
not trusting the family to work out its problems without resort to
force or violence,103 the courts step in to protect the expectations and
interests of the individuals directly affected, most prominently the
child.104 Mnookin describes two very different functions performed
by the courts in child custody disputes: private dispute settlement and
child protection.105 The current state of the law of child custody is, in
essence, expressed as child protection only, and bears little or no rela-
tion to the important associational family function of private dispute
resolution.
Preliminary maneuvering in an adjudicatory child custody dispute
resolution system, then, takes place in a period of instability and drift.
Each party attempts to redefine the husband/wife and parent/child
relationships so that the court will view his/her claim in the most
favorable iight.106 Each party strives to define the relationships that
will replace the husband/wife and parent/child relationships as they
have known them.O7 There is a distinct advantage to the parent who
can establish him or herself as custodian of the child(ren) pending a
final determination because custody actions that do not settle between
the parties typically go on for many months.108 The very fact of the
child's presence in the home of the custodial parent becomes a factor
in that parent's favor given the legal norm that stability is desirable
for children.109 The very act of filing an initial pleading often serves
as a signal that the moving party is willing to litigate unless the other
accedes to his/her demands for custody or visitation, or with respect to
101. Either in litigation or in bargaining in the shadow of such litigation. See Neely,
supra note 64, at 177. See also Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 66, at 978.
102. See Neely, supra note 64, at 177 n.15. See also Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra
note 66, at 986. Mnookin & Kornhauser use a medical analogy to question
whether many legal disputes are "iatrogenic"-that is, induced and created by
lawyers who are ostensible problem solvers. They conclude that little is known
about the extent to which legal representation facilitates dispute settlement and
the extent to which it hinders dispute settlement.
103. See Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 66, at 986. See also Mnookin, supra note
1, at 229.
104. See Mnookin, supra note 1, at 229.
105. I&
106. See Elster, supra note 1, at 6; Neely, supra note 64, at 174.
107. See LAWRENCE A. MosKowITz, UNFAIR TACTIcs IN MATRIMONIAL CASES § 1.1
(1990).
108. I& at § 6.1.
109. I& See also Mnookin, supra note 1, at 264-65; Elster, supra note 1, at 18, 31 ("cre-
ating a fait accompli").
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the support obligationl0. These maneuverings typically take place in
an atmosphere of distrust, and it is common for counsel for the parties
to promptly resort to the court before initiating any negotiation with
the other because of the positional advantages to be had. It is also
worth noting that the custody action itself is typically in an adversary
format, with the parents set off as "plaintiff" and "defendant," or the
like, in the caption. 1 '
Once the court has ruled on the preliminary maneuvering and the
custody action has been initiated, there is a temporary restabilization
of the parties' relationship and they settle into a period of working out
the details of a wholly new set of relationships. The husband and wife
assume the roles of adversary individuals asserting their respective
rights.l12 The non-custodial parent and the children assume the roles
of visitors.1 ' 3 The custodial parent assumes the role of single parent
and monitor of the visitation." 4 The children assume roles such as
"advisors, practical helpers, buffers against loneliness and despair,
replacements for other adults-in other words, parents for their own
parents." 5
It is common during this period for negotiation of one form or an-
other to take place. Mediation or conciliation may even be re-
quired.1 6 In those jurisdictions and in others, this period is a logical
time to attempt to work out a settlement. Although there would ap-
pear to be little incentive to negotiate for the party who has prevailed
in the early maneuvering and who temporarily, at least, has custody of
the child(ren), a high percentage of cases settle during this period."17
For those that do not, mediation, conciliation or private negotiation
between the parties or their attorneys often serve to fine-tune issues
of custody and visitation. The parties may stipulate to medical, psy-
chological, drug and alcohol, and/or home evaluations, or they may
seek to have the court order such evaluations.38 Courts commonly
insist on expert evaluations of some sort as an aid in making a final
determination.19 These evaluations can take months and sometimes
110. Cf Neely, supra note 64, at 177.
111. See, e.g., 42 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 1915.15(a)(1987). For a discussion of the roles
of "plaintiff" and "defendant" which are thrust upon parties, see Fiss, supra note
35, at 123.
112. See Bartlett, supra note 1, at 298.
113. See WALLERsTEIN & KELLY, supra note 5, at 121.
114. Id- at 108.
115. Id. at 102.
116. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 4607 (Deering 1992).
117. See supra note 30.
118. See MosKowrrz, supra note 107, at §§ 4.13-4.17. See also Neely, supra note 64, at
173.
119. See, e.g., Neuman v. Neuman, 377 A.2d 393 (D.C. 1977); Rowe v. Rowe, 393 S.E.2d
750 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990); Marcus v. Marcus, 320 N.E.2d 581 (Ill. App. Ct. 1974);
Christian v. Christian, 535 So. 2d 842 (La. Ct. App. 1988); Freeman v. Freeman,
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result in requests by the party unfavorably evaluated for further eval-
uations.1 20 The evaluations and negotiations, along with the typical
backlog in many courts,12 ' can result in a period of six months to a
year or more 22 in which little seems to happen in the case. And, be-
cause these negotiations are carried out "in the shadow"123 of an adju-
dicatory process, they typically entail not so much a consideration of
the related interests of family members as a bargaining over individ-
ual positions' 24 in light of potential litigation or aversion to litiga-
tion.125 The parties may resign themselves to their respective
positions pending settlement or litigation. Not atypically, the non-cus-
todial parent may be unable to accept the new circumstances and may
drift away from the family.12 6 This period ends either upon settle-
ment between the parties or upon completion of all the evaluations
and the reaching of an impasse in negotiation.
Once the parties reach an impasse in their efforts to reorder their
lives and relationships under the present system they proceed to court
for an adjudicatory hearing. Again under the principle of "the best
interests of the child"127 they seek a determination by the court as to
the relative fitness of the parents. Each side seeks to establish him or
herself as a fit parent presiding over a network of care wherein the
child will thrive, and simultaneously to portray the opponent parent
as unfit and incapable of appropriately caring for the child.128 Of
course, there are cases in which it is clear that the choice of one parent
408 N.Y.S.2d 994 (N.Y. Faro. Ct. 1978); Williams v. Williams, 224 S.E.2d 656 (N.C.
Ct. App. 1976). Cf. Roper v. Roper, 336 So. 2d 654 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976); Re:
Marriage of Bingman, 209 N.W.2d 68 (Iowa 1973). For a synopsis of the history of
evaluative involvement of the helping professions in custody decisionmaking, see
Martha Fineman, Dominant Discourse, Professional Language, and Legal
Change in Child Custody Decisionmaking, 101 HARv. L. REv. 727, 740 (1988).
120. See generally Neely, supra note 64, at 175-76.
121. See supra note 63.
122. See id.
123. See Neely, supra note 64, at 172.
124. See ROGER FISHER & WiLLsm URY, GErTING TO YES, 11-12 (1992). See also Rob-
ert J. Condlin, Bargaining in the Dark" The Normative Incoherence of Lawyer
Dispute Bargaining Role, 51 MD. L. REV. 1, 23 (1992).
125. See generally Neely, supra note 64, at 177. See generally Mnookin & Kornhauser,
supra note 66, at 969.
126. See Furstenburg, supra note 12, at 387.
127. See Mnookin, supra note 1, at 260.
Deciding what is best for a child poses a question no less ultimate than
the purposes and values of life itself. Should the judge be primarily con-
cerned with the child's happiness? Or with the child's spiritual and reli-
gious training? Should the judge be concerned with the economic
'productivity' of the child when he grows up? Are the primary values of
life in warm, interpersonal relationships, or in discipline and self-sacri-
fice? Is stability and security for a child more desirable than intellectual
stimulation?
128. See Elster, supra note 1, at 6, 7.
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as custodian would not be in the child(ren)'s interest, and cases in
which the relationship between the parents is such that the issues are
carefully defined, the judge maintains careful control and the attor-
neys are skilled enough to stress the positive aspects of their cases
without resorting to assassination of the reputation of the opposing
parent.1 29 But the stakes are so high, the risk so great and the emo-
tions so intense that often the safe, prudent course in terms of winning
and losing is the aggressive course.130 And again, even in litigation
free from emotional rancor, the result is typically more commensurate
with a rights-oriented, individual-based view of family than with a re-
lationship-oriented, family-based view.' 3 '
Once the court "resolves" the impasse, whichever parent is deter-
mined to be the custodial parent thereafter can invoke the power of
the court to enforce that status. 3 2 Also thereafter, should there be a
material change in the circumstances of the custodial parent, many
courts will entertain a petition to modify custody, which, in a sense,
begins the process anew.'33
IV. AN ANALYSIS OF THE NEGOTIATORY PROCESS FOR
CHILD CUSTODY CASES
Eisenberg describes an "element of reconciliation"'3 4 associated
with interdependent disputants. This "drive on the part of disputants
to reconcile differences for the purpose of maintaining interpersonal
harmony" is a social norm which grows out of the intimate personal
relationship between the parties (the recognition of oneself in an-
other), or it may be imposed upon them by the greater family or by a
religious or cultural community.135 The element of reconciliation "is
129. See Mnookin, supra note 1, at 251-52.
130. See Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 66, at 974-75 (listing reasons for break-
downs in negotiation despite the fact that "[tihe parties gain substantial advan-
tages when they can reach an agreement concerning the distributional
consequences of divorce." Reasons offered are (1) spite; (2) distaste for negotia-
tion; (3) calling the bluff-the breakdown of negotiations; (4) uncertainty and
risk preferences; and (5) no middle ground.) See also Neely, supra note 64, at 177
n.15 ("Lawyers who do not [behave aggressively] are sacrificing their clients' in-
terests in order to feel good about themselves...").
131. See Woodhouse, supra note 1, at 289 ("[Ihe child becomes the object, not the
subject, of a battle that probes her ties to her parents and questions their fitness
to parent.").
132. See MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 215, § 34 (West 1989); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 1915.12 (1987); Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 2705.01, § 2705.02 (Baldwin 1992); GA.
CODE ANN. § 15-1-3, § 15-1-4 (Michie 1990).
133. See 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5310 (1991); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 729, § 730
(1991); OmIo REv. CODE ANN. § 3109.04 (Baldwin 1992); Wis. STAT. § 767.325
(Supp. 1991).
134. See Eisenberg, supra note 3, at 649.
135. Id at 646-49.
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likely to provide each disputant with an incentive to give some weight
to his opponent's good faith claim or defense and the norms and fac-
tual propositions that underlie it, even if he regards the norms as inva-
lid and the facts as wrong." 3 6 A dispute between interdependent
parties can be resolved if each perceives the other's claim as reason-
able-that is, based upon norms perceived as valid and facts perceived
as accurate. Or a dispute can be resolved if each perceives the other's
claim as asserted in good faith, even if the claim is perceived as unrea-
sonable.137 The element of good faith, in a context that encourages
negotiated settlements, greatly enhances the likelihood of a negotiated
settlement. As a matter of social norm, good faith is commonly ex-
pected of family members. Because the nature of family relationships
is such that trust and reliance on the part of one party can result in
domination and influence on the part of another, each family member
is expected-as a matter of at least theoretical equity and good con-
science-to act in good faith and with due regard for the interests of
the other.Ss
Family, then, is ideally a set of fiduciary relationships. And, given
the premise that those relationships are reordered and not extin-
guished upon divorce, the norms for reordering those relationships
should reward and encourage fiduciary conduct in the reordering pro-
cess and beyond. The emotional and litigious atmosphere which char-
acterizes the dissolution of a marriage is a transitory state. Inherent
in the concept of reconciliation set forth above is the idea that parties
to a dispute are seeking resolution. Their conduct during the marriage
may not have been what one might describe as "fiduciary" toward one
another or toward their child(ren). But that conduct as well could be
characterized as transitory, or in search of resolution. A fiduciary re-
lationship, on the other hand, is a much more stable state. It can be
characterized as a dynamic equilibrium in which mutual self-interest
enables the possibility of more nurturing and interdependent
conduct.139
Where adjudication is binary in nature, negotiation is graduated
and accommodative.14o In negotiation, different legal norms and dif-
136. lcd at 649.
137. 1& (Or, of course, any combination of these two principles. It goes without say-
ing that parties who perceive each other's claim as reasonable could settle their
dispute whether they were interdependent or not.)
138. See supra note 15.
139. See infra note 152.
140. See Eisenberg, supra note 3, at 644-45, 654.
[W]hen norms collide account is taken of both, although the eventual
settlement may reflect an adjustment for relative applicability and
weight. Similarly, the parties... may accord partial or even full recogni-
tion to a norm that is generally deemed subordinate or even legally inva-
lid . . .[and] finally, parties . . .can and frequently do take person-
oriented norms into account as freely as act-oriented norms.
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ferent accounts of facts can be accommodated. In a negotiatory pro-
cess, as in an adjudicatory process, the usually-predominant legal
norm of seeking the best interests of the child can and will be ob-
served,141 as can such dominant legal norms as the preference for bio-
logical parents, 42 the non-custodial parent's "right" to visitation,143
the need for expert evaluation to assist the court in making a custody
determination,144 the concept that custody determinations should be
made in a gender-neutral fashion,145 and each party's right to proce-
dural due process in a custody determination.146 This constellation of
dominant legal norms is a common referent in adjudicatory child cus-
tody cases, in large measure because they are superficially compatible
with the mechanisms of the adjudicatory process and because they
generally do not conflict or collide with one another. But the accom-
modative nature of negotiation permits other norms to be taken into
account to the extent that each is socially authoritative and
applicable.147
For example, family autonomy,148 as seen in the legal norm
whereby the state refrains "from intervening in most intrafamily dis-
putes" and abstains "from endorsing any very specific set of ideas
about marriage and family life,"149 is a fundamentally important con-
cept in interactions between the courts and intact families. When a
relationship between spouse/parents dissolves and the parties resort
to the legal system, that strong principle of family autonomy is sup-
planted by notions of individual autonomy. These notions are in terms
of both state intervention and the expression of endorsement, through
legal norms, of specific ideas about the lives of the parties after di-
vorce.150 But family autonomy continues to be important in reorder-
ing families. Parents are far better able than strangers to make
informed and sensitive decisions about what is best for their chil-
dren.'51 They have unmatched knowledge of the history of the child;
Id at 644-45.
141. See supra note 47.
142. See Shoemaker v. Shoemaker, 563 So.2d 1032, 1033 (Ala. Civ. App. 1990); Brooks
v. Carson, 390 S.E.2d 859 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990); In re Criqui, 798 P.2d 69, 71-72 (Kan.
Ct. App. 1990); Johnson v. Diesinger, 589 A.2d 1160, 1164 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991).
143. See Worley v. Whiddon, 403 S.E.2d 799 (Ga. 1991); In re Walsh, 451 N.W.2d 492,
493 (Iowa 1990).
144. See supra notes 118, 119.
145. See supra note 35. See also Mnookin, supra note 1, at 235; Elster, supra note 1, at
9-10; Neely, supra note 64, at 170.
146. See supra Mnookin, note 1, at 263-64. See also DiStefano v. DiStefano, 380
N.Y.S.2d 394, 394-96 (N.Y. 1976).
147. See Eisenberg, supra note 3, at 654.
148. See Mnookin, supra note 1, at 264.
149. See GLENDON, supra note 21, at 145. See also Elster, supra note 1, at 22.
150. See Woodhouse, supra note 1, at 278.
151. See Mnookin, supra note 63, at 1034-35.
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of the subtleties of the child's personality; of the child's physical and
emotional needs. Parental decisions can be based upon the subtle in-
teraction of the parents' affection for the child and their mutual self-
interest.152 Parents are likely to listen to the child and are more likely
to be able to assign the appropriate weight to the child's wishes with
respect to custody and visitation. 153 And the appearance of parental
autonomy is of vital importance to the child's sense of a safe, orderly
and predictable world.154 Nevertheless, adjudication strips the family
of that autonomy and substitutes a stranger for the parents as the au-
thority figure. A negotiation-based dispute-resolution system could
accommodate these important realities of family life. While providing
152. See Mnookin, supra note 1, at 266:
[T]here are affirmative justifications for making the family the presump-
tive locus of decision-making authority, particularly if there is no social
consensus about what is best for children. Within the family, the child is
more likely to have a voice in the decision, even if his wishes may not be
determinative. Family members are more likely to have direct knowl-
edge about a particular child. Affection for the child and mutual self-
interest of family members are more likely to inform decisions.
Even where the parents are divorcing, family members continue to have mutual
self-interest. That each has self-interest is obvious. An adjudicatory system stops
with consideration of the individual self-interests of the parties and the child's
interest. Self-interest is mutual for parents in that each has an interest in the
child's well-being (and therefore each has an interest in the economic and mental
health of the significant others of that child); each may have an interest in his/
her ongoing economic relationship with the other parent; each may have an inter-
est in establishing himself/herself in his/her own new role as single-parent or
visitor-parent; each may have an interest in the way he/she is perceived in his/
her (and/or in-law) family; each may have an interest in the way he/she is per-
ceived in his/her community; each may have an interest in minimizing the stress
and uncertainty of ongoing litigation; etc.
153. The current dominant legal norm takes into consideration the child's wishes
where the child is of sufficient maturity. See In re Susen, 788 P.2d 332, 334 (Mont.
1990); In re Marriage of D.M.B. and R.L.B., 798 S.W.2d 399, 402 (Tex. App. 1990).
Inherent limits on this norm ("one factor to be considered," "if the child is of
sufficiently mature age"), while apparently common sense, illustrate the system-
atic destruction of trust presided over by an adjudicatory system. In order to
keep the process orderly and efficient, child custody adjudication relegates con-
sideration of the needs and desires of the child (See WALLEISTEIN & KELLY,
supra note 5, at 41 ("in order to be truly helpful, the adult has to understand what
the child is thinking and feeling.")) as expressed by the child (regardless of age)
in the fiduciary atmosphere of an autonomous family to a "bargaining endow-
ment" (See Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 66, at 968-69) for the parent who
can prevail upon the child's favor. In a system which purports to reorder a prob-
lematic set of relationships, the law provides incentives (See Neely, supra note
102) for the parents and their attorneys to maneuver for superior individual posi-
tion rather than to consider, in terms of the mutual self-interest of all of the
family members, all possibilities for a mutually beneficial reordering (see
Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 102). Such a system stresses its unnatural-
ness to the children by having a powerful stranger depose parental authority and
impose limits on family input.
154. See WAizERsTErN & KELLY, supra note 5, at 41.
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guarantees that a child's "best interests," in the sense of the child-
protective function,1 55 will be assured, a negotiation-based system
could, at the same time, provide for the child's best interests with
something more closely approaching the subtlety with which parents
in an intact family continually provide for a child's best interests.
To take the family autonomy norm a step further, both children
and parents in a reordering family have a need to understand that re-
ordering as coherent, predictable, orderly, rational, and leading to im-
proved conditions in family relationships.1S6 They need to see the
resolution process as a "serious and carefully considered remedy for
an important problem." 5 7 In fact, family members (and particularly
children) in the reordering family, just as in an intact family, stand to
benefit in terms of personal growth from the process of working out
differences. s58 An adjudicatory system disorients family relationships
while attempting to impose a sense of order from on high. The inher-
ent inability of an authoritative stranger to predict the behavior of a
family from the past conduct of its members, and to sense the full
array of social norms that define the values of that family, leave him/
her in the unenviable position of exercising judicial discretion with
indeterminate standards on which to base a decision. These same in-
abilities render adjudicators unable to set forth determinate rules by
which to resolve custody disputes. The solution to this dilemma seems
to lie outside the context of adjudication.159
Another example of the ability of a negotiatory dispute-resolution
system to accommodate important social norms can be seen in gender
considerations. As indicated above, in the current, adjudicatory pro-
cess, a strong legal norm has developed over the past thirty years that
requires equal treatment of parents of both genders in child custody
cases.160 This has resulted in the effective elimination as a legal norm
of the Tender Years Doctrine-the presumption that, all things being
155. See Mnookin, supra note 1, at 268. See also supra notes 22, 103-05.
156. See WALLERSTEIN & KELLY, supra note 5, at 17.
157. Id.
158. Adjudication takes from the ongoing, reordered family the power to deal with
and learn from its problems. Id. See also GLENDON, supra note 21, at 17:
The child's understanding is reinforced by the perceived improvement in
the condition of the parent, and thus, though the transition period may
be difficult, the child's overall sense of coherence and order is not under-
mined. Moreover, under these circumstances, the child's very efforts at
mastery may be additionally rewarded by a greater understanding of the
nature of human relationships in general.
159. See Mnookin, supra note 1, at 264. Mnookin suggests that a preferable alternative
system of custody dispute resolution must incorporate the following legal norms:
that family autonomy be given a high value; that continuity and stability in rela-
tionships be assumed to be important and desirable for children, especially for
young children; and that whatever legal norms are followed should not contradict
deeply held and widely shared social values.
160. See supra text accompanying note 35.
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equal, children of tender years belong with their mothers. Neverthe-
less, there is still a strong social norm reflecting persistent differences
in the reality of gender-role expectations. 16 ' Statistics indicate that
mothers continue to be custodial parents in a very high percentage of
cases. The adjudicatory process weighs a constitutional abstraction-
gender equality-against this broad-based social reality and, finding
the abstraction more consistent with its dominant legal norms, elimi-
nates the parental caretaking reality, not to mention the reality of the
economic inequality of the genders, 162 from direct consideration in
child custody disputes. While of course one might argue that by elimi-
nating the tender years presumption the adjudicatory system compels
consideration of each parent on his or her individual merits,163 the
practical effect of this process has been to force mothers (who, gener-
ally, have more invested as primary caretakers and are therefore more
averse to the risks' 64 of custody litigation that would have been
mooted by the presumption) to bargain away other rights, particularly
economic rights,165 that directly affect the equilibrium of ongoing fam-
ily relationships and even the interests of the children.166
A negotiatory process in child custody law might have accommo-
dated the common reality of mothers as primary caretakers while con-
tinuing to express and foster important emerging notions of gender
equity. 67 It might have prevented the precipitous shift 1 68 that has re-
sulted in a growing class of impoverished single-parent families and
estranged visitor-parents. 6 9 What might have emerged over the last
thirty years had a negotiation-based child custody dispute resolution
system been in place is something closely resembling the primary
161. See WEITZMAN, supra note 90, at 243. In 87% of cases mothers receive custody
without dispute. In the remaining 13%, whose resolution is undertaken through
and in the shadow of adjudicatory systems, studies show success rates for fathers
varying from 38% to 63%. See Nancy D. Polikoff, Why Are Mothers Losing: A
Brief Analysis of Criteria Used in Child Custody Determinations, 7 WOMEN'S
RTs. L. REP. 235-37 (1982). See also Sharon K. Araji, Husbands'and Wives'Atti-
tude-Behavior Congruence on Family Roles, 39 J. MARI. & FAM. 309 (1977). See
generally supra note 3.
162. See Neely, supra note 64, at 179.
163. Id at 170. See also Jed H. Abraham, The Divorce Revolution Revisited.- A
Counter-revolutionary Critique, 3 AM. J. FAM. L. 87 (1989).
164. See Neely, supra note 64, at 177.
165. Spousal support, child support, maintenance (alimony), marital property distribu-
tion, attorneys fees and costs of litigation.
166. See WEITZMAN, supra note 90, at 318. See also Neely, supra note 64, at 181.
167. See Fineman, supra note 119, at 773. See also Martha L. Fineman, The Politics of
Custody and the Transformation of American Custody Decision Making, 22 U.C.
DAvis L. REv. 829, 833 (1989).
168. See WErTzMAN, supra note 90, at 323.
169. Id. at 337.
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caretaker presumption that struggles to gain a foothold today.17o
What has instead emerged is a system preoccupied with individual
rights at the expense of families; a system preoccupied with the bene-
fits of individualized inquiry into relative parental fitness 171 which
overlooks the reality that such inquiries intrude upon family relation-
ships, distort family relationships, and consume time and resources
badly needed to facilitate family reordering.172
The concept of time in a custody case provides yet another example
of the superior suitability of a negotiation-based resolution system to
child custody disputes. One of the justifications for the binary nature
of adjudication is its suitability for economical decision making. 7 3 In
fact, binary decision making does take a much smaller investment of
time and energy on the part of the decision-maker than would more
accommodative decision making. But the investment of time and en-
ergy that really matters in such cases is that of the family members,
and particularly the children. And while both adjudicatory systems
and negotiatory systems demand time and energy from the parties,
adjudicatory systems provide incentives to the parties and their legal
representatives to engage in time- and resource-consuming activi-
ties.174 Adjudicatory systems force parties to resort to mechanisms
(expert evaluations, court dockets, attorneys)11 5 over whose timeli-
ness they have little or no control.
The slowly grinding machinery of the courts inevitably exacerbates the emo-
tional stresses that result from the simple fact of divorce. Among the damag-
170. See Neely, supra note 64, at 180. Neely describes the Primary Caretaker Parent
Rule in West Virginia as according.
an explicit and almost absolute preference to the ... parent who: (1)
prepares the meals; (2) changes the diapers and dresses and bathes the
child; (3) chauffeurs the child to school, church, friends' homes and the
like; (4) provides medical attention, monitors the child's health, and is
responsible for taking the child to the doctor, and (5) interacts with the
child's friends, school authorities, and other parents engaged in activities
that involve the child.
171. Id at 172-73. Id.
172. See Neely, supra note 64, at 173-75. The "individualized inquiry" is a classic justi-
fication of adjudicatory child custody dispute resolution systems and commonly
results in a rigid, inequitable and unbalanced bargaining process, the norms of
which are designed to facilitate binary, stranger-controlled impasse resolution.
Such an inquiry skews and stunts the bargaining process. Neely notes that "very
few custody arrangements receive even the dubious benefit of a judicial determi-
nation that they are in the 'best interests of the child'." Id- at 173.
173. See supra text accompanying notes 61-62.
174. See supra note 102 (Neely on effect of incentives on lawyers). See also Elster,
supra note 1, at 31. See also WALLE.STEIN & KELLY, supra note 5, at 123 ("[I~f
anything the courts, and the embattled partners and their respective attorneys,
have directed their efforts to imposing restrictions and strict conditions which
further encumber a relationship which under the best of circumstances is fragile
and needs encouragement.").
175. See Neely, supra note 64, at 174. See also Elster, supra note 1, at 22.
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ing effects of custody litigation are uncertainty, painful psychological probing
... and competitive parental bribery. The magnitude of these effects is a di-
rect function of the time it takes to conclude the proceedings. 17 6
The time factor is compounded further still by the fact that a child's
sense of time is different from that of an adult. A two-year custody
dispute represents twenty percent of the life of a ten year old child.
Living such a period under acute stress is likely to profoundly affect a
child's well-being.177
Unquestionably a negotiatory child custody dispute resolution pro-
cess would put demands on the time and energy of parents and chil-
dren. But the parties would be working with a much higher degree of
mutual self-interest toward prompt resolution of that dispute;1 8
would have much more efficient access to the "facts" upon which such
a resolution could be based (and, because the facts have been exper-
ienced by both, would not need to spend time formally discovering and
"proving" the facts);179 and would have much greater control over the
timeliness of the process18 0 .
Where an adjudicatory system will restrict itself to act-oriented
legal norms,18 ' a negotiatory system can accommodate consideration
of person-oriented norms. In a child custody action this flexibility
might be particularly important. Several commentators have ob-
served that as the relationship between a wife and husband dissolves,
the need of one or both to assign fault for the perceived failure of the
marriage is not being met by a legal system that has effectively elimi-
nated fault as a factor in the grounds for divorce.'8 2 Because there is
no legal forum for dealing with feelings of loss, betrayal or opposition
to the divorce, these feelings may affect the parties' conduct in the
child support and child custody cases.' 8 3 Regardless of how objec-
tively reasonable the respective positions of the parties are, the need
176. See Neely, supra note 64, at 176.
177. "A child will experience a given time period not according to its actual duration,
measured objectively by calendar and clock, but according to his purely subjective
feelings of impatience and frustration." GOLDSTEIN, FREUD & SOLNIT, supra note
64, at 41. See Bruch, supra note 64, at 108.
178. See supra note 152.
179. See supra notes 74-79.
180. See supra note 173.
181. See Eisenberg, supra note 3, at 657.
182. See Timothy B. Walker, Family Law in the Fifty States: An Overview, 25 FAM. L.
Q. 417, 439 (1992). Only twenty states continue to have traditional fault grounds
in addition to irreconcilable differences or irretrievable breakdown. Id at 439-40.
183. See Woodhouse, supra note 1, at 289. See also MARYGOLD S. MELLI, HOWARD S.
ERLANGER & ELIZABETH CHAmBuss, THE PROCESS OF NEGOTIATION: AN Ex-
PLANATORY INVESTIGATION IN THE DIVORCE CONTExT, 25 (Institute for Legal
Studies Working Paper No. 7-1, 1985), Disputes Processing Research Program
Working Papers 1, 24 (1985)("[B]ecause they lacked any substantial legal basis for
litigating the fundamental issue of whether to end the marriage, they fought
about other matters."); Davis v. Bostick 580 P.2d 544, 546 (Or. 1978).
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to air these emotions, and perhaps to have satisfaction for their
arousal, is very likely to interfere with prospects for a settlement. In a
negotiatory system the possibility exists that the parties will address
these feelings in some creative way that will provide satisfaction and
remove an impediment to the constructive reordering of the family
relationships. This may take the form of an agreement to participate
in counselling; a public admission of fault that will have no conse-
quences beyond the emotional impact of the public admission; even a
personal apology. A negotiatory system would thus accommodate a
social norm (the need for emotional satisfaction) so that the larger
dispute could be resolved, at the same time addressing the emotional
effect of participation in the custody process in a constructive
manner.184
Thus, due to its graduated and accommodative nature, a negotia-
tory dispute resolution process could accomplish all that an adjudica-
tory process could accomplish and more. Parents working to resolve a
dispute through a negotiation-based system could address the child's
best interests'8 5 with a subtlety and insight that a judge could not
match. The visitor-parent's interest in his/her relationship with the
child could be accommodated in such a way that the custodial parent's
interest in the success of the visitor-parent/child relationship would
be less likely to be masked by positional posturing that an adjudica-
tory system tends to encourage. 8 6 Minimum standards (and unfortu-
nate effects) of gender equality in the custody process could be
transcended by a system that expresses clearly that it is in nurturing
families that the social contract is founded and values and notions of
moral conduct (equity; equality) are transmitted. 8 7 Family interde-
pendence and support-both personal and economic-make it possible
for family members to devote the necessary energy to this nurturance.
Thus, "[o]ur ideals of equality tell us that both men and women should
be wage earners, and that both men and women should be nurturers,
and that care giving should not go uncompensated, whoever is doing
it."188 A negotiatory system could flesh out the concept of gender
equality in family law, so that it is more than a matter of individual
liberty, self-fulfillment and bargaining lever. 8 9 The concept is incom-
plete unless it is also seen as a matter of nurture and
interdependence.190
184. See supra notes 71, 80.
185. See supra note 140.
186. See supra notes 80, 142. See also Furstenburg, supra note 12, at 390 ("[Tlhere is
virtual agreement among researchers that children are better off when raised by
parents whose relationship is stable, warm, and mutually supportive.").
187. See Woodhouse, supra note 1, at 271. See also GLENDON, supra note 29, at 306-07.
188. See Woodhouse, supra note 1, at 271.
189. See id. at 284.
190. Id. at 282 (An essential purpose of family is to serve as "a stable base for the
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In sum, negotiation-based child custody dispute resolution would
be much more apt to give parents freedom and encouragement to re-
flect upon what happened in their intact marriage that can be instruc-
tive to their reordering process; what is happening to their child(ren)
and themselves as their relationships are reordering; and the degree to
which their mutual self-interest depends upon the fiduciary nature of
those new and reordered relationships.19 1
V. A PROPOSAL
The primary focus of the system proposed here is upon the change
which must occur in the way family law accounts for American fami-
lies and the way it is accountable to American families. The law must
be premised upon an understanding of family as existing beyond the
point of legal dissolution of the husband/wife relationship.192 And it
must encourage the individual members of the reordering family to
accept that fiduciary interdependence is in their mutual self-interest.
To those ends, such a dispute resolution system should strive to elimi-
nate indeterminacy wherever possible; to provide legal norms to gov-
ern future conduct (both social conduct of family members and legal
conduct of parents as parties to custody actions) which embody the
principles that family continues beyond divorce and that its relation-
ships need to be encouraged and protected; and to effectively provide
for the settlement of disputes that have arisen out of past conduct,
through a system which facilitates mediation, opportunities and incen-
tives for negotiation, and impasse mechanisms that model, validate,
and express those norms. Wallerstein and Kelly define divorce as:
a process which begins with the escalating distress of the marriage, often
peaks at the separation and legal filing, and then ushers in several years of
transition and disequilibrium before the adults are able to gain, or to regain, a
growth of children and the mutual support of adults. Law should encourage and
reward family-centric, cooperative, nurturing behavior."). See also Bartlett,
supra note 1, at 304 ("[W]e care about the workings of these relationships not
solely because we care about children, but also because we care about the kind of
society in which we live.... [O]ur larger concern is how the interests of both
parent and child link together in these relationships.").
191. In several studies, fathers in typical [intact] families spent an average of
only twelve to twenty-four minutes a day in solo child care. The typical
visitation schedule may actually increase the quantity of solo time a child
spends with the father.... Studies of children after divorce indicate that
they benefit from continued relationships with their absent fathers.
However, it is not the amount or frequency of visitation but the level of
financial support that benefit not only materially but psychologically
from this tangible proof of their father's support.... It is the intergener-
ational commitment and tangible help that fathers give which matter
most to children-and to fathers, as judged by their conduct in intact
families.
Woodhouse, supra note 1, at 284-85.
192. See supra text accompanying notes 5-7.
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sense of continuity and confidence in their new roles and relationships. 1 9 3
The law should regard the family, at least insofar as it involves chil-
dren, as a lifelong commitment 94 and the process of divorce and cus-
tody determination as "a serious and carefully considered remedy for
an important problem"195 in the family. Such a remedy is "purposeful
and rationally undertaken"196 and "indeed succeeds in bringing relief
and a happier outcome"197 for the family.
Thus, in this proposed system for processing child custody cases,
the transition from intact family to family in which a key relation-
ship-that between the parents-is dissolving would be viewed and
handled somewhat differently from the way current systems view and
handle it.198 Since the separation and subsequent legal action are a
"serious and carefully considered remedy1 99 to a problem that began
some time earlier in the relationship between the spouses, a period of
drift and maneuvering following separation would be counterproduc-
tive.2 00 For that reason, immediately upon initiating a custody action
with the court a conference would be held at which time an Interim
Order would be established. The parties would be strongly en-
couraged to initiate the custody action together, on the very day of
separation or by appointment when anticipating a separation. The ini-
tiation of the action would be styled more as an application than as a
193. See WALLERsTEIN & KELLY, supra note 5, at 4.
194. Almost 60% of divorces in the United States involve couples with minor children.
See GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAw, supra note 1, at 93. See
also BERRY, supra note 9, at 117.
By describing it in such a way [see description in quote at supra note 9]
we begin to understand marriage as the insistently practical union that it
is. We begin to understand it, that is, as it is represented in the tradi-
tional marriage ceremony, those vows being only a more circumstantial
and practical way of saying what the popular songs say dreamily and
easily: 'I will love you forever'-a statement that, in this world, inescap-
ably leads to practical requirements and consequences because it pro-
poses survival as a goal.
195. See WALLERSTEI N & KELLY, supra note 5, at 17.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Again, in the abstract, the process can be outlined as follows:
1) Intact Family
2) Dissolution of Spousal Relationship within Family
3) Drift Period/Preliminary Maneuvering




7) Impasse Resolution Procedure
8) Determination/Modification
199. See supra note 193.
200. See Furstenburg, supra note 12, at 399. See also supra text accompanying note
106.
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pleading, and would be filed under a caption that does not set the par-
ents up as adversaries, but rather purports to address the important
problem that the family is having (e.g.: In re: Custody of...).
I propose that the primary caretaker presumption be adopted. It is
attractive primarily because it is the most clearly determinate alterna-
tive in terms of the parent/child relationships during the reordering of
the family relationships.201 Such a rule is likely to attract the objec-
tion that procedure by presumption is a poor substitute for the
"searching factual analysis of the relative parental capabilities of the
parties, and the psychological and physical necessities of the chil-
dren."202 Good parenting, however, is not a matter of relative paren-
tal capabilities in an intact family, and should not be in a reordering
family. It "implicitly recognizes that no one can confidently predict
the future and that the past may in fact be the best indication we have
of future care and concern;" that "[t]he only relevant inquiry should
be which parent has already adapted his or her life and interests to
accommodate the demands of the child."203 Having removed the inde-
terminacy from a prospective custody dispute, it provides for swift res-
olution of the dispute on terms that are gender-neutral and fair.204
The rule presumes that a strong bond exists between a child and her
primary caretaker.205 It eliminates harmful speculation about the
quality and extent of that bond.206 The primary caretaker rule is gen-
der-neutral on its face, where previous custody presumptions were
gender-based.27 While it avoids attempting to impose a specific set of
201. See Neely, supra note 64, at 181. See also Furstenburg, supra note 12, at 398;
Bruch, supra note 64, at 111; Elster, supra note 1, at 37.
202. Ex Parte Devine, 398 So. 2d 686 (Ala. 1981).
203. See Fineman, supra note 119, at 771.
204. See Mnookin, supra note 1, at 290-91; Elster, supra note 1, at 35; Neely, supra note
64, at 179 ("What is needed... is a standard for custody awards that does not
encourage such pernicious bargaining, but which also does not discriminate on
the basis of sex.").
Although there is some unfairness [in the Primary Caretaker Presump-
tion] to parents who do not take a preeminent role in caring for their
children before divorce, that unfairness is more than balanced by the
effectiveness of the rule in preventing the trading of children for money
and in reducing drastically the need for complex and damaging inquiry
into family life and parental fitness.
Id at 186. See also Fineman, supra note 119, at 769:
A legal model that relies on both legislative and judicial institutional
roles in formulating custody rules would have to give some credence to
traditional legal values such as procedural due process: the right to a
hearing, the right to cross-examine witnesses, and so on.... [Tihese le-
galisms are not vestiges of an arcane system; they embody a consensus
about important values in our society.
205. See GoLDSTEIN, FREUD & SOLNIT, supra note 64, at 17.
206. See Neely, supra note 64, at 176.
207. Although it may result in more maternal custody arrangements than a best inter-
ests approach, "[t]he primary caretaker test is not designed to remove the poten-
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parenting values upon the parties, it does create a legal norm that en-
courages nurturing behavior among family members.208 And the pre-
sumption that a strong bond exists between the primary caretaker and
the child not only does not preclude an ongoing relationship between
the visitor-parent and the child, it can encourage it by serving as a
concrete model for the kind of fiduciary conduct that members of a
reordering family should continue to expect from one another.
In the event there is a question as to the primary caretaker, the
master or judge presiding at the conference would be empowered to
convene a fact-finding inquiry. The sole issue at this inquiry would be
which parent is the primary caretaker.2 09 Evidence would only be
taken to positively establish a parent's relationship to the child(ren)
and not to derogate the relationship between the other parent and the
child(ren).
The master or judge would then indicate her finding with respect
to custody and act as a facilitator while the parties discuss temporary
visitation. This process should be quite brief, and if the parties are
unable to stipulate to visitation the master or judge should prescribe
temporary visitation, stressing to the parties that the Order is tempo-
rary and clarifying to the parties how the system will proceed from
that point21o and the extent of their power to work out a more suitable
tial for fathers to obtain custody at divorce .. . As with most gender-neutral
rules, its impact may not be gender neutral, but this result only reflects the fact
that women are the primary nurturers of children in our society." Fineman,
supra note 119, at 773.
208. Ic '"The positive message that the rule sends to parents about what is valued by
the legal system and by society at large is clear and unambiguous." Id at 774.
209. Chief Justice Neely suggests that, in the small percentage of cases in which it is
not obvious which parent is the primary caretaker, the issue can be resolved
"with lay testimony by the parties themselves, and by that of teachers, relatives
and neighbors." He confidently predicts that the matter can be resolved "in less
than an hour of the court's time in most cases." Neely, supra note 64, at 181. Cf
Elster, supra note 1, at 37-38 (arguing that if the principle is implemented in a
"rough and ready manner" that it is relatively unhelpful when confronted with
families in which both parents work full time, and that its expressive effect might
be to give parents an incentive not to work; and that if it were implemented in a
more "finely tuned" manner it would sacrifice the advantages of speed and avoid-
ance of litigation).
210. Wallerstein and Kelly report that their findings
amply document the freestanding character of the nuclear family at
these critical junctures; the striking unavailability of supports for the
children, and the absence of resources for information and guidance.
Parents who are uncertain about what to do have no reliable place to
turn. Most cannot draw on their own personal histories for models in
their new situation; there is little accumulated wisdom and the many
new roles of the visiting parent, joint custody, father custody, and step-
parent are in the process of evolving-and the rules are not clearly de-
fined. As a result, people are thrown back even more on the passions or
anxieties of the moment in making decisions with long-range conse-
quences for themselves and their children.
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arrangement.
At some point in this initial conference each of the parties would
have an opportunity to indicate to the master or judge that a medical,
psychological, drug and alcohol, or other evaluation would be appro-
priate. The judge or the master should stress to the parties that par-
ents are presumed to be fit;211 that an allegation of medical,
psychological, drug and alcohol, or other problem that might endanger
the child(ren) will result in an investigation or evaluation by the child
welfare agency of the court; that an allegation and request for evalua-
tion would result in the same evaluation being performed on both par-
ents; that, in order to overcome the presumption that a parent is fit to
parent, it must be shown by clear and convincing evidence not only
that the parent has the problem alleged, but that the problem has re-
sulted or is likely to result in neglect or abuse of the child; and that
the costs of such an evaluation, if it does not establish the unfitness of
the parent in question, must be borne by the parent requesting the
evaluation. The system should ensure that these evaluations are per-
formed as quickly as possible. In extreme cases (and again only upon a
showing that if the parent has the problem alleged, the child is likely
to suffer abuse or neglect in the custody of that parent during the pen-
dency of the evaluation) the master or judge could place the child(ren)
with relatives or others pending the outcome of the evaluations. In
those cases the evaluations should be performed even more rapidly
than usual. It might be prudent to put a legal limit on the time for
emergency placement evaluations which could be extended only upon
proof that the delay was unavoidable and that the extended period of
time will be as brief as possible. The reports of the evaluators would
address only the question of the fitness of each parent, and not in
terms relative to each other.212 The reports would be tailored to the
very high standards of the presumption of parental fitness, and would
be free of suggestions or comments by the evaluators. The reports
would be available to parties for review in the presence of the court,
and the parties would have a limited right to challenge the methodol-
WALLERSTEIN & KELLY, supra note 5, at 317. This need for an reliable and accu-
rate information logically extends to information about the legal process as well.
See BINDER, BERGMAN & PRICE, LAWYERs As CouNsELoRs: A CIENT-CENTERED
APPROACH, 20, 24 (1991).
211. West Virginia law, which contains a primary caretaker presumption, describes a
fit parent as one who "(1) feed[s] and clothe[s] the child appropriately; (2) ade-
quately supervise[s] the child and protect[s] him or her from harm; (3) provide[s]
habitable housing; (4) avoid[s] extreme discipline, child abuse, and other similar
vices; and (5) refrain[s] from grossly immoral behavior under circumstances that
would affect the child." Neely, supra note 64, at 181.
212. Id- "In this regard, the court is not concerned with assessing relative degrees of
fitness between the two parents, but only with whether the primary caretaker
achieves a passing grade on an objective test." Id.
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ogy of the evaluations.213 After review, the records would be sealed or
expunged.
The Evaluation Order, if sought, and the Interim Order, would
take the proposed process into the temporary restabilization stage in
the abstract above,214 having essentially eliminated the dangerous
drift stage. A minimum of tactical and strategic sniping will have oc-
curred between the individual parents, and the state's parens patriae
concerns about protection of the child(ren) will have been accom-
plished with a minimum of intrusion into the fragile family
relationships.
While resorting to a primary caretaker approach to custody may
seem to summarily dismiss the breadwinner parent from the lives of
the caretaker parent and child(ren), in fact, it clears the way for ap-
propriate attention to the visitor-parent/child relationship. The ab-
sence of incentives for rancorous posturing between the parents clears
the atmosphere for negotiations about visitation that can explore the
needs of the new relationships from a fiduciary perspective. At this
point in the process of reordering family relationships, with the legal
status of all concerned temporarily secured, fledgling new relation-
ships215 within the family-relationships that will be the basis for the
reordered family which will continue indefinitely--can begin to de-
velop in an atmosphere much more stable and trust-enabling than that
in the typical case in the current system.216
213. See supra note 119; Neely, supra note 64, at 173. Fineman (in the context of con-
sidering appointment of counsel for children in child custody disputes) cautions
against giving undue weight to the advice of helping professionals "that should be
only one factor in fashioning a judge's opinion. This may result in the social
worker's or psychologist's functionally being the ultimate custody decision
maker....." Martha L. Fineman, The Politics and the Transformation of Ameri-
can Custody Decision Making, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 829, 859 (1989). See also
Sheila Rush Okpaku, Psychology: Impediment or Aid in Child Custody Cases, 29
RUTGERS L. REV. 1117, 1144-45 (1976); Mnookin, supra note 1, at 258-59 ("While
psychiatrists and psychoanalysts have at times been enthusiastic in claiming for
themselves the largest possible role in custody proceedings, many have conceded
that their theories provide no reliable guide for predictions about what is likely to
happen to a particular child.").
214. See supra note 198.
215. As the family breaks apart, each parent-child relationship essentially sw-
ings free of the structure that has held it in place. The chain of reactions
so abruptly set off may reverberate for several years and lead to new
relationships greatly at variance with those that obtained when the fam-
ily was together-relationships, indeed, that have no real counterpart in
the intact family. These include the relationships based on visiting, the
hostile alignment of child and one parent against the other parent, and
the various combinations of custody.
WALLERSTEIN & KELLY, supra note 5, at 99.
216. Child support, another issue commonly under consideration at this point in the
custody process, might also be considered under the proposed alternative system
See infra note 231. Child support is arguably just as important an aspect of in-
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The visitor-parent/child relationship is a poignant example of such
a relationship. Under the current system, the relationship between
non-custodial fathers2 17 and their children often tends to attenuate.2 1 8
There are varying theories as to why this happens but the facts that
visitor-parent is a role with few prominent models in society; is a role
for which society provides no training; and is a role with little societal
support must be considered here.219 Children are also thrust into a
role for which there is no model, no training and little support. The
visitor-parent/child relationship is, nevertheless, a fact of post-separa-
tion life.
Its parameters, its limits, and its potentialities are new and remain to be ex-
plored. Many questions come immediately to mind about the nature of the
relationships within the postdivorce family: To what extent and in what ways
is the visiting parent likely to maintain his or her earlier role? Under what
circumstances is this likely to change? When is the visiting parent able, or
willing, to remain a central parenting figure to the child? And for how long,
and for which children?2 2 0
Wallerstein and Kelly point out that the "constraints and patterns of
the visits"221 profoundly affect the relationship between the visitor-
parent and the child, and call for the visiting arrangements them-
selves to be examined.2 2 2 They describe a "compressed, funnelling
process" 2 23 the difficulties of which have been insufficiently appreci-
tergenerational commitment and tangible parental help as visitation. For pur-
poses of this article, however, I will limit my proposal to those areas addressed by
current child custody law.
217. "Although different custodial arrangements are emerging throughout the coun-
try, the dominant shape of over 80 percent of the postdivorce families is that of a
custodial mother with whom the children reside and a father who has visitation
rights." WALLERsTEIN & KELLY, supra note 5, at 121.
218. Although the causes of this phenomenon are not well understood, Furstenburg
suggests that most estranged fathers "seem to retreat from paternal responsibil-
ity when they no longer reside with their children" and argues that this might be
attributable to a view of many men that "marriage and childcare [are] an insepa-
rable role-set. Accordingly, men often sever ties with their children in the course
of establishing distance from their former wives." Furstenburg, supra note 12, at
387-88.
219. See WALLERsTEIN & KELLY, supra note 5, at 121. See also supra note 215.
220. See WALLERSTEIN & KELLY, supra note 5, at 121.
The broad parameters of the new role are unclear. To what extent is the
visiting father a guest, a favorite uncle or a parent? More explicitly, to
what extent does the visiting parent continue to take responsibility for
setting behavioral and moral standards? To what extent does he register
approval or disapproval, or enforce discipline or even homework, and
how can he do so without the built-in safeguards and bedtime rituals of
intact family life which lessen disappointment, soften anger, and provide
safe channels for alleviating the inevitable conflicts and frustrations of
the relationships?
Id. at 123.
221. Id at 121.
222. Id
223. Id. at 123.
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ated and have in fact been exacerbated under the current system: "[I]f
anything the courts, and the embattled partners and their respective
attorneys, have directed their efforts to imposing restrictions and
strict conditions which further encumber a relationship which under
the best of circumstances is fragile and needs encouragement." 224
The importance of this phase for the future of the reordered family
must not be underestimated. That visitation is important to children's
postdivorce welfare is commonly appreciated, even under current
law.225 What is commonly less appreciated is that the relationships
formed in the post-divorce custody process have a profound effect
upon the relationships that members of the reordered family will
form throughout their lives thereafter. As Professor Bartlett puts it:
The resolution of conflicts over children ultimately is less a matter of objec-
tive fact-finding than it is a matter of deciding what kind of children and fami-
lies--what kind of relationships-we want to have.... [W]e care about the
workings of these relationships not solely because we care about children, but
also because we care about the kind of society in which we live. We want a
society in which parent-child relationships are strong, secure, and nurtur-
ing.... [O]ur larger concern is how the interests of both parent and child link
together in relationships. Parents being responsible for children, in other
words, fits the best picture we have of ourselves. 2 2 6
Wallerstein and Kelly stress the centrality of both parents to the
psychological health of children, and urge that custody laws help par-
ents to "shape postdivorce arrangements which permit and foster con-
tinuity in the children's relations with both parents."227 The
unfortunate tendency in current law is to identify fathers with indi-
vidual freedom and (custodial) mothers with "sacrifice, permanence
and family obligation," thereby permitting the visitor-parental rela-
tionship to wither within a few years of the legal dissolution of the
spousal relationship.228 The mandate for changing the expressive ef-
fect of child custody laws cannot be anymore clear. Here again we
have the basic premise for reordering under the proposed system: that
inherent in a post-divorce custody case is the emergence of new family
relationships such as the visitor-parent/child relationship, and that so-
ciety has as strong an interest in the sound development of this rela-
tionship as it does in the parent/child relationship in an intact family
or in the husband/wife relationship. Clearly both parents and, espe-
cially, the children of divorced parents stand to benefit as well. In the
critical phase of the transition from intact family to reordered family,
224. Id
225. See Carol S. Bruch, Parenting At and After Divorce: A Search for New Models, 79
MIcH. L. REv. 708, 721 (1981).
226. See Bartlett, supra note 1, at 303-04.
227. See WALLERSTEiN & KELLY, supra note 5, at 311.
228. See Woodhouse, supra note 1, at 285. She continues: "A law that valued nurture
and promoted family-centric behavior would not tolerate this dissonance." Id. at
286. See also supra note 218.
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these new relationships need latitude and encouragement on all
fronts. These premises should be developed into a new set of expres-
sive legal norms for a negotiatory process that can make flexible, ac-
commodative and creative use of them. In addition to the
fundamental principle that family is a set of fiduciary relationships
that continues beyond dissolution of the legal relationship between
husband and wife,229 these norms should include the primary care-
taker presumption23 0 and a clearly expressed premise that a goal of
the legal process is to devise a visitation arrangement for the parents
and child(ren) that would best foster ongoing relationships within the
family. The latter would provide parents with an incentive to look
past traditional adjudicatory notions of custody/visitation to arrange-
ments that would consider realistically and interdependently the in-
terests of parents and children in their new relationships.231
As the negotiation period begins, the remaining process would be
explained to the parties through to the impasse procedure (perhaps in
writing, with illustrative examples; perhaps in person by a trained
facilitator; perhaps both) and a date for submission of plans would be
established. Rather than have the parties negotiate visitation in the
shadow of adjudication-a process that encourages individualistic and
rights-oriented behavior and provides disincentives to negotiate in
good faith-I propose that the custody dispute-resolution system sub-
stitute Final Offer Selection as its impasse procedure.
Final Offer Selection developed in public sector collective bargain-
ing. It was first proposed as a substitute 1) for the strike, which was
generally recognized as an ineffective and destructive impasse mecha-
229. This would, of course, be of rather less importance in childless marriages.
230. It has been convincingly argued that an expressive function of a law containing a
Primary Caretaker Presumption would be to indicate to parents that society val-
ues nurturing behavior and that parents should take that into consideration in
prioritizing among career and family choices. See Fineman, supra note 119, at
773. See also Neely, supra note 64, at 186.
231. [S]tudies of intact families show that time is not the essence of father-
child relationships. In several studies, fathers in typical families spent
an average of only twelve to twenty-four minutes a day in solo child care.
The typical visitation schedule may actually increase the quantity of solo
time a child spends with the father.
Studies of children after divorce indicate that they benefit from con-
tinued relationships with their absent fathers. However, it is not the
amount or frequency of visitation but the level of financial support that
most closely correlates with children's well-being. Perhaps children
benefit not only materially, but psychologically from this tangible proof
of their father's support .... It is the intergenerational commitment and
tangible help that fathers give which matter most to children--and to
fathers, as judged by their conduct in intact families. This commitment
to family solidarity should be sustained in the postdivorce family, not
undercut by law.




nism in disputes between interdependent disputants, and 2) for the
threat of strike, which loomed over labor-management relations, set-
ting norms for disputant conduct that locked the parties into positions
which were destructive to their ongoing relationship.23 2 In Final Of-
fer Selection, or, as it is sometimes called, Final Offer Arbitration, a
third party is empowered to choose between plans for resolution of the
dispute submitted by the respective parties and to impose that plan as
the final and binding resolution of the impasse.23 3 The selector may
not pick and choose to assemble a resolution that he/she feels would
be best suited to the parties' situation. The views of the selector, a
neutral stranger, as to how the parties' dispute would best be resolved
are of no consequence whatsoever in the Final Offer Selection process.
The resolution comes in its entirety from a plan set forth by one party
or the other.234 In theory, the prospect of the other party's plan being
more acceptable to the selector encourages each party to present an
offer that will be perceived as more reasonable by the selector. In
public sector collective bargaining this norm of reasonableness has its
basis in the welfare of the public-that is, the parties are forced to
express their offers in terms which address the fact that public wel-
fare is served by labor and management interdepending. Although Fi-
nal Offer Selection is a process for resolving impasses, its true purpose
is to compel the parties to negotiate a resolution.
Of primary importance in establishing a final offer selection procedure is the
basic tenet that it is a procedure to force the parties to their own negotiated
settlement and it is not to be regarded as merely another substitute for the
strike. Thus the most effective procedure would be that which least encour-
ages the use of the strike, while retaining the capability of deciding the par-
ties' dispute if so required.2 35
Variations on the process have been used in public collective bar-
gaining settings around the country for years.236 It is best known, per-
232. See Arnold M. Zack, Final Offer Selection-Panacea or Pandora's Box? 19
N.Y.L.F. 567,569 (1974). For the seminal article on Final Offer Selection see Carl
M. Stevens, Is Compulsory Arbitration Compatible with Bargaining?, 5 IND. REL.
38 (1966).
233. Zack, supra note 232, at 569.
234. Id,
235. IAl at 578.
[While] a more equitable resolution might be achieved if the decisions
were made on an issue by issue basis, and certainly the arbitrators would
be more comfortable with this arrangement,... it must be borne in mind
that the sense of reasonableness on the part of the arbitrator and the
achievement of the most equitable or desirable agreement, are not the
primary purposes of final offer selection. Rather, the objective is in-
dependent settlement by the parties. The greater the risk to each party
of submitting a final offer, the greater the likelihood of settlement.
Id at 578-79 (emphasis added).
236. Id- at 574 (Eugene, Oregon Code § 2.876; City of Indianapolis Agreement with




haps, as the impasse procedure called for in the Basic Agreement
between owners and players in Major League Baseball.237 The process
has its successes and failures; its proponents and detractors.238 But it
is worth exploring here primarily because, while it offers finality in
the event of an impasse,2 39 it is an impasse mechanism that fits
uniquely with, a non-adjudicatory dispute resolution system. If the
parties must resort to the impasse mechanism, the process will likely
have significantly narrowed the area of disagreement between
them.240 Where the impasse mechanism results in a resolution that
one or both parties consider unfair, the prospect for future voluntary
settlements between these parties and between child custody dispu-
tants to come is improved.24 1 More likely, each will find the risk of
having the other's plan implemented too great and find a compromise
agreement preferable.2 42 But either outcome will serve as a deterrent
to impasse and an incentive to negotiate subsequent disputes in the
same case and disputes in other cases.
Adoption of a dispute resolution system such as that proposed here
would, no doubt, mean significant change in the expressive function of
child custody law. It is foreseeable that, were such a proposal enacted,
lawyering in the area of child custody cases might develop along the
lines of a certified expertise in custody/visitation plan architecture.
Public policy favoring fiduciary conduct in ongoing families might re-
sult in statutory incentives (tax breaks, for example) for settling with-
out use of the impasse mechanism.
VI. CONCLUSION
It is a fundamental premise of adjudication, in child custody cases
and elsewhere, that autonomous choice by the individual in search of
his own self-fulfillment is "the highest value in the social enter-
prise."243 The legal norms that emerge in an adjudicatory system
serve that value to the exclusion of others.244 This Article has endeav-
237. See James B. Dworkin, Salary Arbitration in Baseball. An Impartial Assessment
After Ten Years, 41 ARB. J. 63 (1986).
238. See Zack, supra note 232, at 577-78 (discussing disadvantages of the process and
prospects for improving the procedure).
239. Id at 573 ("in lieu of the open-endedness that has characterized mediation and
fact-finding.").
240. HARRY H. WELLINGTON & RALPH K. WINTER, JR., TIE UNioNs AND THE CITIES,
180 (1971).
241. See Zack, supra note 232, at 579. Of course, in a child custody case steps would
have to be taken to ensure that a result that the parties find unfair would in no
way be detrimental to the best interests of the child.
242. Idc; See supra text accompanying note 18. See also Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra
note 66, at 969-71.
243. See Bush, supra note 1, at 13.
244. 1&
Fundamental rights are important because they protect the individual's
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ored to show a variety of ways in which adjudication, as a dispute reso-
lution system for child custody cases, is essentially inappropriate in
terms of the selection and application of norms, the determination of
facts, the range of available remedies, the emotional effects on the par-
ties, and its expression of social and legal norms.
First, adjudication abstracts such important social norms as indi-
vidual fundamental rights (gender equality, for example), social jus-
tice, and even social solidarity and welfare into legal norms of self-
gratification and self-absorption. It expresses these norms in a man-
ner that is antipathetic to other important social norms favoring fidu-
ciary values among family members.
Second, because of its binary nature, adjudication stifles any refer-
ence to values that conflict or collide with norms of individual auton-
omy. Adjudication engenders a confusion between public values and
private values.245 Because they serve the fundamental value of indi-
vidual autonomous choice, such legal norms as the best interests stan-
dard, the preference for biological parents, the non-custodial parent's
"right" to visitation, the need for expert evaluation to assist the court
in making a custody determination, the concept that custody determi-
nations should be made in a gender-neutral fashion, and each party's
right to procedural due process in a custody determination are ac-
knowledged in adjudicatory systems as public values.246 The estab-
lishment and articulation of these values is seen as an important
function of adjudicatory systems. Relationship-based norms, such as
the concept of family autonomy and the premise that family contin-
ues, reordered, after divorce, often conflict or collide with these ac-
cepted norms. Adjudicatory systems lack the ability to accommodate
these conflicts and collisions, and the tendency is to view them as in-
compatible with important public values, and thus as private values.
The notion of imposition upon private values is anathema to individual
autonomy. Silence in the law with respect to social or moral values of
any kind other than those protecting and encouraging the autonomy
of individuals expresses a legal norm that implicitly demeans fiduciary
values.247
Third, the binary nature of adjudication restricts interplay among
autonomous choice against the state. Social justice is important because
it protects the individual's autonomous choice against other possibly
more powerful individuals or groups. Maximizing social welfare is inti-
mately connected with autonomy, because it equates individual autono-
mous choice with the public good... Finally, solidarity is crucially
important in this system, because something has to hold the whole struc-
ture together in the presence of so much individual autonomy.
245. See generally Bush, supra note 1, at 6.
246. See supra notes 141-46.
247. See supra notes 40-44.
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norms that would expose legal norms to the rigor of comparison with
the variety of fiduciary social norms that are persistently held as pub-
lic values. Child custody adjudications are typically highly individual-
ized determinations made against the backdrop of broad and vague
discretionary standards.248 In most states, because such a determina-
tion can be overturned on appeal only if an abuse of the adjudicator's
discretion is shown,249 relatively few of them are appealed and, thus,
relatively few are reported. This further insulates legal norms in
child custody adjudications from public expression and discourse.
Fourth, adjudicatory systems are too often preoccupied with the
procedural rights of individuals250 and futile attempts to predict pa-
rental suitability,251 thereby giving insufficient consideration to the
delicate process of reordering of relationships which occurs in a family
when the parents divorce.25 2 Furthermore, accuracy in portraying the
relationships of family members as they were while the family was
intact, and as they are as the family reorders, is also sacrificed for the
sake of procedural fairness.253
Fifth, adjudication gives great emphasis to efficiency and (particu-
larly judicial) economy, but its nature and mechanics create many of
the inefficiencies that it works hard to correct. A negotiatory system
would eliminate much of this inefficiency simply by reempowering the
parties, and would be much more sensitive to the psychological strains,
the economic and social inequities, and the full range of public values
inherent in each case.254
Finally, child custody adjudication is dependent upon the past acts
of the parties, and scrupulously avoids consideration of the personal
relationships involved in a dispute. This dependency limits the range
and quality of possible resolutions to child custody disputes,255 and
typically makes very little use of the insights of the parties into what
would work for their reordered family.
The essential difference between adjudicatory systems of child cus-
tody dispute resolution and non-adjudicatory systems is that adjudica-
tory systems stress individual autonomy to the exclusion of any other
value. It is not the purpose of this article to argue the primacy of com-
munitarian values over individual values. Instead, I have hoped to
propose a system that acknowledges the necessity of a tension be-
tween the individual and the community256 and accommodates the full
248. See supra note 32.
249. See supra note 33.
250. See supra note 146.
251. See supra note 57.
252. See supra note 172.
253. See supra text accompanying note 74.
254. See supra text accompanying notes 61-79, 173-80.
255. See supra text accompanying notes 80, 81.
256. See Bartlett, supra note 1, at 305-06
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range of public values and social norms. A negotiation-based system
like that proposed in this Article values the individual sense of self-
fulfillment and the individual parent's autonomous choice (as against
the state and other possibly more powerful individuals or groups) as to
how to raise their children. But it also values "the fulfillment of the
individual's capacity for moral development, for going beyond self-in-
terest and being concerned with others" 257 and "the discovery of a
common good beyond any private vision of the good, through the en-
counter between self and others."25 8
The proposed system of custody dispute resolution aspires to more
than just rules that define minimally acceptable behavior.259 It recog-
nizes that an essential aspect of our individuality is our ways of "ac-
counting to ourselves for ourselves;"260 that it is only in our
relationships that "our individuality has a use and a worth; it is only to
the people who know us, love us, and depend on us that we are indis-
pensable as the persons we uniquely are."261
Reconciliation between the community as a collection of individuals, and
individuals who necessarily find themselves in community, also comes as
individuals struggling to achieve their own notions of responsibility in-
ternalize the norms and restraints of the community. This process, with
all of its tensions and conflicts, reflects our dual nature as both individu-
als and social beings. We seek freedom within a community that limits
our choices. We are potential agents of resistance in a community which
itself has formed us. We cannot resolve these tensions, but we must con-
front them as we address the here-before-us human conflicts that come
to the law for answers.
Id See also Fiss, supra note 35, at 128. Fiss, through his "structural reform"
model of adjudication, sees the emphasis on equality since the 1960s not so much
as a fixation upon an individual right, but rather as standing for "an entire way of
looking at social life" in which rights are "the concrete embodiment of [public]
values, and as such, were an expression of our communality rather than our indi-
viduality." Id-
257. See Bush, supra note 1, at 14.
258. Id.
259. See Bartlett, supra note 1, at 293.
260. See supra note 11.
261. See BERRY, supra note 9, at 118.
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